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Abstract 
This thesis examines the challenges multinational enterprises face from political risk when making and 
operating foreign direct investments. The thesis considers political risk and a wide variety of approaches to its 
analysis and provides insight into the process of foreign direct investment, the nature of the political threat facing 
it, foreign investment decision making by multinationals, and the tools developed in the commercial, academic, 
\ 
and governmental arenas to avoid and combat the effects of political risk. In essence, the thesis addresses a 
business application of theories and methodologies used in political studies. 
The first hypothesis is: if political risk is properly understood as a phenomenon of the political 
environment, then it a) defies direct quantification and b) can be explained as a series of discrete elements 
which can be analyzed separately. The second hypothesis is: if political risk is properly understood as a 
series of non-quantifiable . elements, analysis of political risk cannot be depended upon alone to protect 
multinational enterprises from political risk in foreign direct investment. 
The first hypothesis is addressed through a critical review and consideration of business and political risk 
literature. Two analytical tools are developed in this process: a ladder of cognition consisting of a series of 
conditions of knowledge which can be held regarding a specific risk, and indicating the type and approximate 
accuracy of analysis which can be undertaken of such risk; and a representation of the political risk equation as a 
two stage process consisting of an abstract (environmental) risk event and a discrete effect which the event may or 
may not have on a specific investment. 
The second hypothesis is addressed through a critical review of methods of political risk analysis 
including "qualitative" approaches with roots in traditional studies and "quantitative" approaches derived from 
statistical analysis and behavioralist-based determinism. Critiques of each approach include operational strengths 
and weaknesses, performance histories (when applicable), conceptual and practical capabilities from the 
perspective of the analytical tools described above, and theoretical strengths and weaknesses from the perspective 
of the political studies discipline. 
Both hypotheses are supported and the thesis concludes by revieWing tools which can be used by 
multinationals to manage and mitigate the effects of political risk and considering additional academic work in this 
arena which would be useful in developing this application of political studies. 
vii 
Int·roduction 
An investment is made when the expected return on invested capital exceeds the cost of 
capital used in the investment by a percentage which is greater than that which could be 
generated by any alternate investment. 1 
One of the fundamental principles of free enterprise is that the employment of capital is a rational action 
oriented toward maximizing return on investment. In fact, innumerable other issues can enter into the investment 
decision. One of the most common of such factors is the perception of an investment's potential vulnerability to 
risk. 
Risks in business include such basic possibilities as fire in the factory, unexpected changes in interest rates 
or ta."<ation, equipment failures, or a labor dispute. Such risks are generally described in terms of the likelihood or 
probability of their occurrence and by the kinds of costs they can exact on a business. The more likely and/or 
eXpensive, the "higher" the risk. 
Most business enterprises operate in a familiar environment and enjoy a good understanding of their local 
polity. In such settings, business risks are essentially financial or economic in nature and are therefore predictable. 
Businesses careful about their investments use economists, actuaries, and econometric models to identify risks, 
determine the probability of their occurrence and costs of their effects, and develop a business plan which will 
provide profits despite them. 
Investment in foreign countries is not essentially different from domestic investment, but foreign direct 
investment (FDI) attracts additional risks of a political nature that are not usually encountered in domestic business 
activity.2 FOi requires multinational enterprises (MNEs) to' work within two or more distinct polities with 
different norms, sets of laws, and goals and expectations. This creates the potential for conflict -- the possible need 
to !serve two masters.' It also obliges the MNE to operate within an unfamiliar environment where indicators of 
!Raymond Vernon, "Conflict and Resolution Between Foreign Direct Investors and Less 
Developed Countries," Public Policy, Vol. XVIII (Fall, 1968), p. 334 . . 
2Stefan H. Robock and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), p. 9. 
1 
Part I Introduction 2 
potential risks may not be recognized and what should be easily predictable or avoidable hazards can have major 
and costly consequences due to this lack of awareness. 3 Such ignorance is the fundamental factor of vulnerability 
to politically-based risk in FOi: the greater the differences between the home and host environments, the more 
likely the investor is to be ignorant of the host environment and the more vulnerable the investment is likely to be 
to such risk. 
This is why major political risk is such a recent phenomenon relative to the centuries long history of FOi. 
Before decolonization, the polities of colonies and protectorates were largely controlled by imperial governments 
and presented a stable investment environment of few surprises. MNEs could expect a high rate of return on 
investment, low local taxes, few regulations, and little threat to their assets. Even after decolonization, weak and 
inexperienced host governments often made it appear as if multinationals were powerful enough to keep their 
hosts's 'sovereigl}ty at bay. '4 
As time passed however, governments in many developing countries began to seek control over MNEs. In 
some cases, this resulted in a large scale seizure of foreign owned assets. But outright nationalization discourages 
the new foreign investment needed to support continued development, so this approach is no longer common. Host 
governments have now developed more subtle, more effective, and in some ways even more expensive forms of 
economic nationalism to maximize the benefits they receive from FOi. s 
Foreign direct investment has become a high stakes 'wager,' where an MNE bets it will be able to earn a 
return on its investment greater than its aggregate cost and a host government bets the investment will provide 
3R.J. Rummel and David A. Heenan, "How Multinationals Analyze Political Risk," in Douglas N. 
Dickson (ed.), Managing Effectively In the World Marketplace (New York: Harvard Business Review and John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1983), p. 382. 
4The phrase was coined to represent the phenomenon of the sovereignty of developing countries being 
subsumed by powerful, self-interested MNEs which considered themselves to be beyond the control of any single 
country. See Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, (New York: Basic Books, 1971) and "Economic Sovereignty 
at Bay," in Raymond Vernon, The Economic and Political Consequences of Multinational Enterprise: An 
Anthology (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 1972 [Article 
originally published in 1968]), pp. 3-19. 
5C. Richard Peterson, "Can Multinationals Survive in Today's World?" Risk Management, Vol. 28 
(February, 1981), p. 35 and John D. Sassi and Shaheen F. Oil, "The Art of Corporate Crystal Ball Gazing: Political 
Risk Analysis Experiences at Gulf Oil Corporation," in Jerry Rogers (ed.), Global Risk Assessments: Book I 
(Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), p. 2. 
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benefits (in tenns of capital, employment, training, technology, taxes, or anything else the government values) 
greater than the costs it exacts on the country's economy.6 The political risk involved in such a wager "cannot be 
captured by minor addenda to the principles of finance, such as calculating the appropriate risk adjustment for a 
target rate of return or computing the appropriate price to be paid for a hedge. "7 It is not "realistic to use only 
commercial and technological assessments as planning inputs, for [if] the life of any venture may be cut short by 
political disruption," the nature and causes of such must be investigated and accounted for in the planning 
process.8 
Political risk is now a major concern for any enterprise considering a foreign direct investment. Dealing 
with this problem is a significant activity in both the private and public sectors. Large MNEs with high foreign 
risk exposures devote substantial time, money, and effort to a variety of in-house attempts to lower their political 
risk. Smaller enterprises which do not have the same deptb of resources tum to outside vendors for similar service. 
International banks and commercial political risk services offer foreign investors everything from thumbnail 
sketches of countries through sophisticated country risk assessments and rating indices to multi-faceted analyses 
using econometrics and other highly technical modelling techniques. Even governments provide political risk 
analysis through trade ministries and quasi-public corporations established to encourage investment in developing 
countries. 9 
This thesis examines the challenges MNEs face from political risk when making and operating foreign 
direct investments. Critical consideration of political risk and a wide variety of approaches to its analysis will 
provide insight into the process of foreign direct investment, the nature of the political threat facing it, FDI 
6John T. Reid, "Perspective: Managing Country Risk for a Manufacturing Corporation," in Richard J. 
Herring (ed.), Managing International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 187. 
7Raymond Vernon, "Organizational and Institutional Responses to International Risk," in Richard J. 
Herring (ed.), Managing International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 211. 
8F.T. Haner, "Rating Investment Risks Abroad," Business Horizons, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April, 1979), p. 18. 
9David Bruce, "Integrating Political Risk Methodologies at a California International Bank," in Jerry 
Rogers (ed.), Global Risk Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), p. 
132. 
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decision making in multinationals, and the tools developed in the commercial, academic, and governmental arenas 
to avoid and combat the effects of political risk. These critiques will be theoretically grounded but will focus on the 
practical issues of political risk for those making direct investments in developing countries. 
The first two chapters provide a foundation for the analytical work which follows. They are designed to 
act as an introduction to the field of political risk and to facilitate an understanding of the relevant ideas and 
terminology. 
Chapter 1 defines and discusses the terms and concepts needed to develop a practical understanding of 
political risk. Throughout the chapter, the goal will be to establish definitions of relevant concepts which are as 
broad and inclusive as possible while still being useful, and to identify supportive terminology which is 
etymologically consistent with the definitions. The chapter opens with a consideration of the nature of foreign 
dire~t investment and introduces the two primary actors in the FDI equation. A variety of oth~r terms are also 
defined and several additional issues addressed. 
Chapter 2 provides a somewhat broader introduction to and background on the topic of foreign direct 
investment and political risk. It then outlines the hypotheses, goals, and organization of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 
Definitions.and Terminology 
"Direct investment implies a transfer of resources -- technology, management skills, 
marketing knowledge, ·capital, etc. - from the home to the host environment. It also entails 
control in the managerial sense. The direct investor transfers resources, usually scarce in the 
host economy, and maintains control over the use of the resources in their new environment." 1 
Three things differentiate direct investment from other investment:* the nature of what is invested, the 
element of control after the investment is made, and the implication the investment is made for operational 
purposes. Foreign direct investment (FOi) can be defined as the investment of capital and non-capital assets (e.g. 
personnel, expertise, technology, or trademarks) in a foreign country for use by, or under the control of, the 
investor for purposes other than solely the marketing of imported goods. 
When a multinational enterprise (MNE) chooses to enter a market through a direct investment (as 
opposed to a sales agreement with a local agent), the goal is generally diversification or flexibility in meeting local 
market demand. 2 A second potential motivation for foreign direct investment is a desire to minimize the risk 
which comes from doing business with others. To accomplish this, MNEs build vertically integrated chains of 
ownership or control over raw material or component supplies, transport, and sales and marketing. 3 . When a 
government refuses to pennit market entry without a direct investment, or actively solicits a direct investment and 
1Stephen J. Kobrin, "The Political Environment," in Vern Terpstra, et. al., The Cultural 
Environment of International Business (Cincinatti: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978.), p. 235. 
*Business investment is generally divided between direct investment and portfolio investment. The latter 
is the investment of liquid capital (cash or its equivalents) in shares of stock in a business, or in other so-called 
'securities,' and does not entail any managerial control. Michael Z. Brooke and H. Lee Remmers, The 
International Firm: A Study of Management Across Frontiers -- Trade and Investment (London: Pitman 
Publishing Limited, 1977), pp. 248-249. 
2Philip R Cateora, "The Multinational Enterprise and Nationalism,'' MSU Business Topics, Vol. 19, No. 
2 (Spring, 1971), p. 49. 
3Raymond Vernon, "Organizational and Institutional Responses to International Risk,'' in Richard J. 
Herring (ed.), Managing International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsy./vania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 191. 
5 
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offers an agreement which makes the investment appear profitable, the government initiation constitutes a third 
stimulus for FDI. 4 
Schmidt labels these three types of foreign direct investment conglomerate - made for expansion; 
vertical - made for integration; and horizontal - made to parallel existing operations. He also identifies three 
individual factors which characterize every investment: the sector of economic activity (e.g. agriculture, light 
manufacturing, banking) in which the investment is made; the technological sophistication of the operation; and 
whether the investment is wholly or only partly owned by the investor. 5 An additional specific characteristic is 
common to virtually all foreign direct investment: it "must be considered as reasonably permanent and involves 
substantial commitments of parent company human and capital resources. "6 
(_~ 
"Risk analysis [including political risk analysis] is part of the theory of rational choice, 
and in order to appear within that theory at all (participants] must be represented as rational 
actors."7 
The operative question in considering the activities of any "rational actor" is "what they have good reason 
to do. 118 To this question must be added two caveats: 
1. The operative question is properly considered as a matter of perception. The theory implies the actions of 
rational actors can only be based on information or experience available to them. This set of knowledge 
may be different from that held by an analyst, so actions may appear irrational without actually being 
irrational. 
4Harold Crookell, "Investing in Development - A Corporate View, Columbia Journal of World Business, 
Vol. X, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 80-82. This activity also can stimulate investment indirectly. One of the 
concessions commonly offered to attract an investor is market protection. If an MNE sees a strong market position 
in a country put at risk by protection being offered to a competitor, it too may choose to invest in domestic 
production facilities to defend its own market share. This motivation is also known as the 'bandwagon' effect. 
5David A. Schmidt, "Analyzing Political Risk," Business Horizons, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July/August, 1986), 
pp. 46-47. 
6Dolph Warren Zink, The Political Risks for Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countries: With a 
Case Study of Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 26. 
7John Dunn, "Country Risk: Social and Cultural Aspects," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), 
Managing International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 144. 
8/bid. 
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2. Nations, and in some cases even governments, are not necessarily actors per se. They may behave as 
unitary entities, but they tend to be aggregates of individual actors with individual interests. In the case of 
political risk, this trait may also apply to opposition political groups, entities which could be thought of as 
'would be' governments. 
_Mtiltinatlon;i Ent~r?ri~e~ 
"While there is no universally accepted definition of [multinational enterprise], it is 
generally considered to be a company having production and marketing facilities in many 
countries, enjoying worldwide access to capital, depending on foreign income, and being 
managed with a worldwide point of view. "9 
This broad generalization is no more than a guide to the tangled group of terms and definitions which 
describe the independent actor in foreign direct investment. Brooke and Remmers identify over fifteen discrete 
definitions and conclude that despite similarities between them, the definitions have significant differences, the 
differences tend to be arbitrary, and there is no compelling evidence to favor any single definition over any other. 10 
Arbitrary definitions are invariably deterministic -- including some business entities under the aegis of the label, 
excluding others, the final tally often dictating the conclusions a writer will make. Things can be little different in 
this case, although the nature of the study is such that the choices will not impose specific conclusions. 
Most definitions of multinational enterprise are based on thresholds which an enterprise must surpass to 
be considered an MNE. Among the determinants used are the percentage of assets owned or controlled by a firm in 
countries other than that in which its headquarters is located, the number of countries in which production or 
similar operations are held, and/or the amount of turnover or gross or net income from such 'foreign' operations as 
a percentage of the firm's total. Other factors used in various definitions include the nature of foreign investments 
being held, the length of time an enterprise has been involved internationally, and the internal structure of the 
. 
enterprise (which is supposed to suggest whether the enterprise views itself as a truly 'multinational' entity or as a 
domestic business with an outside investment). l l 
9David W. Ewing, "MNCs on Trial," in Managing the Multinationals: A Harvard Business 
Review Reprint Series (Boston: Harvard College, 1974 [Article originally published in 1972]), p. 157. 
lOBrooke and Remmers, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
11zink, op. cit., p. 5. 
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The tenns available to describe multinational enterprises are equally varied. 12 Corporation is used often 
instead of enterprise, as are finn and business among others. For multinational, various writers have substituted 
international, supemational, and transnational. 
Multinational is chosen here not just because it is now the closest thing to a consensus tenn, but because 
it has the appropriate connotations. Where 'international' merely suggests involvement beyond one set of borders, 
'multinational' seems to go a step further, to involvement within more than one set of borders. 'Transnational' on 
the other hand, when not being used interchangeably with multinational,• generally refers to a small subset of 
multinational finns with leadership and roots in more than one country (e.g . . the Anglo-Dutch corporations 
Unilever and Royal Dutch/Shell), while 'supemational' describes enterprises which act as if they exist beyond the 
borders of any country (a description or accusation often used twenty years ago to describe ITT). While the present 
use of multinational is not intended to exclude finns which might fit or aspire to fit either or both of the latter 
descriptions, neither is it intended to require such characteristics. 
'Enterprise,' 'corporation,' 'firm,' 'business,' and so forth, are virtually interchangeable in most situations, 
but enterprise, significantly, does not require or presume any particular type of business organization. Enterprise 
can therefore stretch over the entire array of different types of corporations around the world and also include non-
corporate groups such as partnerships which might be involved in multinational business. 
Multinational enterprise as used in this thesis therefore refers to any business entity which has made a 
foreign direct investment regardless of the size, purpose, structure, profitability, or other characteristics of the FDI 
and regardless of the structure, orientation, or goals of the enterprise. This means the specific nature, structure, 
and/or outlook of different MNEs may vary greatly from one to another despite a few shared characteristics. If an 
enterprise has made in the past, but no longer holds, a foreign direct investment, it would be considered an MNE 
in the context of any consideration of that investment. Also, in the context of the study of business processes which 
12The following information is taken from a wide variety of sources but is essentially a condensation of 
similar discussions in John D. Daniels and Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments and 
Operations, Fourth Edition (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 16-17 and 
Stefan H. Robock and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), pp. 1-2. 
*Transnational corporation (TNC) was long the term favored for use by the United Nations and other 
international organizations, as well as many writers. 
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necessarily precede a foreign direct investment, any enterprise contemplating such an investment would be 
considered an MNE even in the absence of other characteristics. 
Each MNE has a headquarters element which is generally known as the parent and is located in the 
home country. Both of these are widely used tenns. 13 The foreign investment itself will be known as an affiliate. 
This will avoid any confusion which might be created by using limited or deterministic terminology such as 
'branch office,' 'subsidiary,' 1oint venture,' or 'associated company;' all are affiliates. 14 Should one of the precise 
terms be more appropriate for a specific usage, it will be used. 
MNE Interests, Goals, and Needs 
In order. to analyze political risk in foreign direct investment, one first needs to understand the 
motivations MNEs have for making such investments. Zink sees MNEs as rational .actors with 'primary goals' of 
"profit maximization, growth, asset protection, and survival. 111 5 Gladwin and Walter identify a total of six MNE 
objectives: 
1. To find large and growing markets; 
2. To achieve and benefit from market domination in both sales and resource acquisition; 
3. To minimize all costs; 
4. To minimize exposure to all fonns of risk; 
5. To avoid or minimize.all artificial barriers to trade and finance;* 
. 6. To mmdmize net profits.16 
All of these goals overlap and are empirical in nature. Shubik argues they are merely components of one 
overriding desire: to maximize profits at minimal risk. 
13Brooke and Remmers, op. cit., p. 3. 
14Norman A. Baglini; Global Risk Management: How U.S. Corporations Manage Foreign Risks (Risk 
Management Society Publishing, Inc., 1983), p. 2. 
1szink, op. cit., p. viii. 
*This refers to trade and finance barriers which would interfere with the operations of the business in 
question. Barriers which would assist in the achievement of other goals by blocking the activities of competitors 
are not necessarily included. · 
l6Thomas N. Gladwin and Ingo Walter, Multinationals Under Fire: Lessons in the Management 
. of Conflict (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1980), pp. 503-504. 
-: 
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Shubik adds a normative component to the goal structure: the desire to be seen as 'a good corporate 
citizen.' Because l\ilNEs are more than merely economic entities, they must be sensitive to their social and political 
roles in countries in which they operate. 17 In order for an enterprise to be capable of doing anything else 
effectively, its workers, customers, and neighbors must be satisfied with its behavior. In this case, neighbors refers 
to not just those people who literally neighbor a plant or other business site, but to all groups in society at large, 
including government organizations, which perceive an interest in the activities of the enterprise and have some 
means and capability of making their expectations felt. If the enterprise is a publicly held corporation, 
stockholders are among those who must be kept happy. Conflicting needs and expectations among different groups 
can make the 'satisfaction factor' particularly problematic. 18 
EXHIBIT 1.1: THE BUSINESS INTERESTS OF A TYPICAL ENTERPRISE* 
Assets 
Secure equity position 
Physical safety of assets 
Secure land rights 
Secure mineral rights 






Ability to hire and fire 





Access to equipment 
Access to raw materials 
Right to export 





Access to foreign markets 
Fair competition 
To meet these goals, a business enterprise has certain needs. First and foremost among them is stability, 
not in the sense of peace and prosperity, but in the sense of lack of change. 19 Stability is the basis of long-term 
17Martin Shubik, "Political Risk: Analysis, Process, and Purpose," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing 
International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 112 and 134. 
18Daniels and Radebaugh, op. cit., pp. 374-375 and 409. 
*Taken from William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 1982), p. 32. 
19 Jbid., pp. 374-375. 
.-----------------------------
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planning and development and is therefore crucial to ongoing operational profitability. 20 Several writers have 
suggested that stability is so important, MNEs often will be willing to accept harsh operating and financial 
restrictions and low rates of return on investment in exchange for consistency and predictability. 21 
Other interests have been grouped by Overholt into four categories as shown in exhibit 1.1. These 
'interests' can be summarized as safety (of assets), autonomy (in both organizational management and operations), 
flexibility (across the board), and access (to markets). 
Host Countries 
Host country refers to a nation in which an MNE has made or is considering making an investment. 
Like its counterpart home country, the term is generally accepted throughout the political risk literature.22 As the 
dependent primary actor i1:1 foreign direct investment, host countries are of particular interest in the study of 
political risk in FDI. A representative host country is a rational actor "motivated toward maximization of net 
national benefits ... [e.g.] contributions to development, e:xlJanded foreign exchange earnings, monetary stability, 
economic independence, and national prestige. 1123 Additional motivations include full employment of trained 
workers, training and lower unemployment or underemployment for untrained workers, assistance for and support 
of local business, increased tax revenue, politically tolerable distribution of income, and control over economic 
development, among other things. 24 
200verholt, op. cit., p. 25. 
21Stephen J. Kobrin, }vfanaging Political Risk Assessment: Strategic Response to Environmental Change 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 120-121, R. Hal Mason, "Conflicts Between Host Countries 
and the Multinational Enterprise," California Management Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (Fall, 1974), p. 12, and Zink, 
op. cit., p. 42. 
22Brooke and Remmers, op. cit., p. 3. 
23Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., pp. 384-385. 
24Mason, op. cit., p. 7 and P. Streeten, "New Approaches to Private Investment in Less Developed 
Countries," in John H. Dunning (ed.), International Investment: Selected Readings (Middlesex, England: Penguin 
Books, 1972 [Article originally published in 1969]), pp. 444-445. 
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EXHIBIT 1.2: CONTRIBUTIONS OFMULTiNATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* 
Contributions Nature of Response 
Capital Usage 
Bring iti foreign capital 
Help in capital intensive investment by local investors 
Make more capital intensive investment than local investors 
Show more efficient use of capital than do local investors 
Create a favorable climate for the inflow of other foreign capital 
Create a favorable climate for the approval of loans from 
international organizations 
Create a favorable climate to receive loans from developed 
countries (foreign aid) 
Technology Usage 
Introduce new products soon after innovations in home country 
Introduce new production methods and processes soon after 
innovation 
Conduct research and development locally 
Training 
Train local people in new industrial processes 
Introduce new managerial techniques to national managers 
Increase labor productivity over that found in domestic companies 
Economic Development 
Materially add to the industrial infrastructure 
Develop local supply industries 
Set an example for national corporations to become more efficient 
and productive 
Help in increasing exports 
Create new markets for products other than the local market 
Help in import substitution 
Promote a more equitable income distribution by providing new 
jobs 
Help in developing natural resources 
General 
Promote political stability 
Tend to preserve the existing socio-cultural setting 
' Support and promote technical education 
Support and promote managerial education 



























































*Taken from Subhash Jain and Yash Puri, "Role of Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries: 
Policy Makers' Views," Management International Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1981), p. 63. 
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FDI can provide for these, so it follows that they comprise a country's rationale for pursuing MNE 
investments. In addition, FDI can provide 'human' and other non·traditional forms of capital: advanced 
technology and processes, expertise in all fields of business, access to global resources and markets, and related 
skills andknowledge generally unavailable to developing countries through other channels.25 From a survey of 84 
policy makers in 35 developing countries with 'market' economies, Jain and Puri compiled exhibit 1.2, a list of 
specific contributions for which would·be host countries look and which they expect MNEs to provide when 
considering FDI. 
Additional Definitions 
Political risk itself is the subject of part II, but in the context of 'political risk analysis,' the term analysis 
will represent the entire appraisal process comprising: identification, or the recognition and classification of risk; 
assessment, or the determination of the probability and manner of manifestation of risk; and forecasting, or the 
e"-1ension of identification and assessment into the future. 
For the purposes of clarity and differentiation, 'nationalization' will be used to describe the mass seizure of 
assets by the state and 'expropriati~n· will refer to discriminatory or selective seizures of assets. To constitute 
nationalization, seizures must effect an entire class of business (industrial sector, country of ownership, and size of 
operation are possible classifications). 26 Both terms imply, but do not require, that seizures be made with no 
compensation, or without adequate compensation, for the property and assets taken. 27 
In both theoretical and practical discussions of risk, there will be differentiation between the terms event 
and effect. A risk event is a discrete occurrence •• anything from thermonuclear war to a home~ountry employee 
25Peter P. Gabriel, "MNCs in the Third World: Is Conflict Unavoidable?" in Managing the 
Multinationals: A Harvard Business Review Reprint Series (Boston: Harvard College, 1974 [Article originally 
published in 1972]), pp. 136·137 and Raymond Vernon, "Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment: Hard Choices 
for Developing Countries," in Raymond Vernon, The Economic and Political Consequences of Multinational 
Enterprise: An Anthology (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 1972 
[Article originally published in 197l]a), p. 25. 
26Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., p. 366. 
27Don R. Beeman and Sherman A. Timmins, "Who Are the Villains in International Business,'' Business 
Horizons, Vol. 25, No. 5 (September-October, 1982), p. 8. 
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getting arrested in the host country for saying the wrong thing in public - transpiring in the environment. A risk 
eff'ect is the manner in which the event manifests itself upon the MNE in question (the organization in theoretical 
parlance). A given event may effect an organization directly, through the 'filter' of government or public reaction 
to it, or not at all. 28 
Other Terminology 
Due to the nature of the subject, it will be necessary throughout the thesis to refer to that group of 
countries known variously as the 'Third World,' less developed countries (LDCs), underdeveloped countries, and so 
forth. This thesis will use the tenn developing countries because, in the modern era, no country hosts FDI unless 
it chooses to; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a host country is seeking to develop further. In conte:x1 then, 
the term is not prejudicial or otherwise judgmental. For the sake of simplicity, all host countries not classified by 
the World Bank as 'high income industrialized states' will be considered 'developing.'29 
Another terminological issue of great concern in some circles is the matter of gender. Whenever possible, 
this thesis will employ gender neutral language; however, as the English language has no natural neuter, this thesis 
will follow the tradition of the language and utilize the masculine as the neuter when necessary. 
Finally, to describe a professional with academic training in the discipline of political studies, this thesis 
will use political analyst. The tenn is far from ideal because it is often used to describe those who analyze political 
situations for commercial use regardless of whether they have academic training in political studies. But without 
joining the age old argument as to whether politics is a 'science,' a strong contention is made in part III that 
'scientific' politics is not effectively applicable to political risk analysis in FDI. Therefore, use of the traditional 
term 'political scientist' could be somewhat confusing. The natural alternative choice might be 'student of politics,' 
but this is both awkward and may appear, given the definitional connotations of 'student,' somewhat limiting. 
Likewise, 'political theorist' and 'political historian' may be read to limit the scope of the work undertaken. In the 
28Stephen J. Kobrin, "When Does Political Instability Result in Increased Investment Risk?" Columbia 
Journal of World Business, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Fall, 1978), p. 115. 
29World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. xi. 
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context of the thesis, therefore, political analyst seems the best option and will accordingly refer only to those with 
an academic background in politics. 
Political Risk Insurance 
Insurance is the acquisition of protection against the costs of hann or loss. Insurance is usually purchased 
in the commercial insurance market, where an insurer guarantees a payment should harm occur in exchange for a 
fee paid in advance; however, an MNE can also insure itself internally. The most common self insurance is just a 
variation on the commercial approach -- the retention of funds for use should a hann occur. An alternative is to 
study the situation and take proactive measures to protect against potential harm. 30 This method will be referred to 
as non-financial self insurance (NFSI). This is not to imply NFSI is without cost, merely that 'finance' is not the 
direct method of insurance. 
0 
While insurance is an important issue in the field of political risk, its nature makes it somewhat separate 
from the main line of inquiry in the thesis. When insurance is directly involved in a matter at hand, it will be 
addressed, but when the relationship is tangential, insurance will be discussed in short sections toward the end of 
chapters. 
30s. Prakash Sethi and K.A.N. Luther, "Political Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some 
Problems of Definition and Measurement," California Management Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), p: 
59. 
Chapter2 
Background and Hypotheses 
Political risk is viewed by businesses and business professors alike as something to be avoided. In the 
academic field ofbusiness studies, there has developed a subdiscipline over the last thirty to thirty-five years which 
can be called political risk analysis. 
Political risk analysis differs from traditional, 'pure' academic disciplines in that business professors 
educated in economics, finance, management, actuarial science and the like apply theories and methods developed 
in other fields to business purposes. 1 Political risk analysis was originally oriented toward international 
economics, but for the last twenty years or so has drawn heavily upon political studies and related fields. 2 This 
application of methodologies from 'foreign' fields can create P-roblems for educators and practitioners alike. 
. . . 
Roback argues 'political scientists' provide no help in applying their theoretical 'tools' for situational 
analysis to the problems faced in foreign direct investment (FDI). He asserts that their focus on "'political 
instability' in the form of revolutions [and other major discontinuities] .. .is .not likely to produce the answers needed 
for international business. For one thing, the discontinuities that might affect international business do not 
necessarily require a revolution. Another consideration is that political instability, depending on how it is defined, 
is a separate, though related phenomenon from that of political risk. 113 
Roback does not offer an explanation for this state of affairs --perhaps political analysts do not believe 
their analytical approaches are applicable to business issues - but this situation has not stopped such applications. 
The work is simply being done by economists and business experts with little or no grounding in politics. Because 
1William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 1982), p. 124. 
2Stefan H. Roback and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), p. vi. 
3/bid., p. 357. 
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of the lack of trained political expertise in the fields of international business and political risk in FDI, there 
developed "a gap in the literature bridging the two disciplines [of 'political science' and international business]. "4 
The 'gap' was widened by two contemporaneous series of events in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
increase in expropriation, particularly in South America, triggered a surge in demand for formal political risk 
a~ysis in the hope of protecting multinational enterprises (MNEs) from the effects of such events. At the same 
time, new analytical methodologies became available to supplement the traditional approaches of historiography 
and basic economic analysis. The development of econometrics and the popularization of theories of political 
determinism based on the 'behavioralist revolution' provided 'political risk analysts' entering a burgeoning 
commercial market with the basis of competitive product differentiation. 5 Unlike academics and serious students, 
commercially oriented political risk analysts have little interest in the pursuit of theoretical explanations through 
the "formulation and testing of abstract hypotheses;" they tend to be interested more in substantive results with 
0 
direct applications. 6 As models and methodologies have become trade secrets instead of academic pursuits, the 
field of political risk analysis has become more confused. 
It can be argued then, that "the state of the art of political risk policy, strategy, and tactics has gotten 
stuck. "7 While 'political risk analysis' is commonplace throughout the multinational business community, its form, 
intensity, and effectiveness vary greatly and the use of trained political analysts is still exceptional. Even within 
international banking -- a business sector with a long history of political risk exposure, a particularly high degree 
4Dolph Warren Zink, The Political Risks for Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countrie;: With a 
Case Study of Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. vii-viii. 
soavid Bruce, "Integrating Political Risk Methodologies at a California International Bank," in Jerry 
Rogers (ed.), Global Risk Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), pp. 
132-133. 
6Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple, "An Overview of Political Instability Research 
Methodologies: Basic & Applied Recommendations for the Corporate Analyst," in Jerry Rogers (ed.), Global Risk 
Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), p. 89. 
7Warnock Davies, "Unsticking the State of the Art of Political Risk Management," in Heidi Vernon 
Wortzel and Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1981)), p. 144. 
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of assets exposed to international political risk, and a major role as supplier of political risk analysis to customers8 
- "comparatively few [banks employ] political analysts: most country risk work including the political element is 
still done by economists. 119 
Since the early 1980s, academic work has stressed the need to turn back from behavioralist approaches in 
political risk analysis, to be more careful in the application and integration of practices from 'foreign' academic 
fields, and to incorporate analysis into corporate planning and decision-making in an effective fashion. 1° For the 
most part though, these goals have been reached only by the biggest multinationals with the means, need, and 
patience to spend years of trial and error effort developing effective in-house approaches to dealing with the threat 
of political risk. For most smaller MNEs, the challenges have been too great and the costs prohibitively high. 
The Thesis 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the nature of political risk in foreign direct investment and the tools 
available in political studies to help investors protect themselves from the costs of its effects. 
The first hypothesis is: if political risk is properly understood as a phenomenon of the political 
environment, then it a) defies direct quantification and b) can be explained as a series of discrete elements 
which can be analyzed separately. 
The second hypothesis is: if political risk is properly understood as a series of non-quantifiable 
elements, analysis of political risk cannot be depended upon alone to protect multinational enterprises from 
political risk in foreign direct investment. 
In the course of the thesis, three additional specific goals will be pursued: 
1. To develop consistent definitions of relevant terminology specific enough for effective application and 
flexible enough for wide usage both in business and in future academic studies. 
8James C. Baker and M. Anaam Hashmi, "Political Risk Management: Steering Clear of Risky Business," 
Risk Management, Vol. 35 (October, 1988), p. 46. 
9John Calverley, Country Risk Analysis (London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1985), p. 114, 
emphasis added. The specific nature of'country risk' will be discussed in chapter 3. 
10William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting: Political Risk and 
Economic Opportunity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983) and Stephen J. Kobrin, Managing Political Risk 
Assessment: Strategic Response to Environmental Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
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2. To provide a literature review of the field in a fonnat which imposes some measure of order on disparate 
and discontinuous development tracks. 
3. To establish useful boundaries and parameters for the field which facilitate the application of academic 
tools to business problems and provide a viable base for future applied academic research. 
TheFonnat 
The current state of the study of political risk makes it unrealistic to conduct a standard brief review of the 
significant literature in the field. To do so would require arbitrary and/or deterministic choices and result in an 
incomplete and prejudicial product. The disorder of the field makes it effectively impossible to examine critically 
the problems of political risk analysis without reviewing a large cross-section of political risk literature, so the 
review will be incorporated within the body of the thesis. 
Part II of the thesis is a comprehensive consideration of the phenomenon of political risk in both 
theoretical and practical tenns. Chapter 3 takes a theoretical approach to the problem, examining the evolution of 
'risk' as an economic and business concept and placing it in the political context. Chapter 4 reviews and critiques 
'operational' definitions of political risk developed over the past thirty years. Chapter 5 applies this work to the real 
world manifestations of political risk by assessing classification schemes for different kinds of political risk, 
investigating the ideological and practical roots of political risk, looking at MNE vulnerabilities to various 
manifestations of risk, and identifying various forms of political risk. 
Part III provides practically and theoretically based critiques of a wide variety of approaches to political 
risk analysis. Chapters 6 and 7 address qualitative and quantitative approaches to political risk analysis 
respectively. Each chapter contains a survey of the evolution of the analytical approaches and specific examples, 
practical and theoretical critiques, and a catalogue of strengths and weaknesses for each approach. Chapter 8 
considers efforts in both academia and the commercial sector to move beyond fixed analytical approaches to 
address some of the problems identifies in the preceding chapters. 
Part IV concludes the thesis and ties it together. Chapter 9 applies the preceding work to the FDI decision 
making process within MNEs. Chapter 10 then moves beyond the question of analysis to the issue of political risk 
management, including approaches which could be considered under the aegis of non-financial self insurance. A 
number of management techniques for use both before and after the actual time of entry into the host country are 
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considered. Finally, chapter 11 reviews the major tenets and conclusions of tlie thesis and considers the need for 
additional academic work in the future. 
Purpose and Parameters 
At one level, this thesis is a case study in the potential utility of abstract academic work -- the valuable, 
'real world' role of the theoretical side of political studies and the need for the political analysts themselves to be 
involved in the application of their work. At another level, it is an effort to provide such involvement; to supply 
some of the insight needed for the effective application of political studies methodologies to a bona fide business 
problem. It is not an attempt to propound or defend the practice of foreign direct investment. While the selection 
of the topic does indicate general support for the concept on the part of the writer, the paper itself is merely an 
academic investigation, not a political treattse. FDI will continue to occur as long both parties see value in the 
arrangement; it needs neither defense nor encouragement. 
Another assumption of the thesis is that the field of political risk is an application of the political studies 
discipline.* There will be no attempt to prove this statement per se, but a great deal of evidence suggesting it is a 
reasonable assumption will be presented throughout the thesis. 
Because it deals with a field oriented toward facilitating the application of academic work to business, the 
thesis will aim to cover topics as broadly as possible without sacrificing utility. The primary focus however, will 
always be political risk in foreign direct investment. Should it be necessary to narrow the focus further, attention 
will be given to small and medium sized manufacturing firms with actual operations in place in developing 
countries. 
*This is not to suggest that the field of political risk cannot be viewed also as an applied field of 
international economics or any other discipline, merely that to look at the subject from this point of view is 
reasonable and will be enlightening. In fact, the writer has no argument with those who would assert that political 
risk analysis is the application of tools and lessons from many other disciplines; it is believed however, that this 




"Most writers tend to use 'political risk' as a' catchali tenn for the risk dimensions of 
political events which have an impact on business decisions. As such; [the tenn] is replete with 
definitional incongruities. 11 1 
Political risk is a problematic tenn. Both words are value laden and suggest images and notions which 
may be prejudicial. At best, the words, separately and in combination, are unclear. The two goals of part II are to 
develop a definition of political risk specific enough to be analytically useful and a practical description of it clear 
and broad enough to be applicable to the real world of foreign direct investment. In meeting these goals, part II 
will also provide support for the first hypothesis and lay a foundation for the analysis in part III. 
Chapter 3 addresses, in both theoretical and practical terms, the concept of risk. It starts with early 
0 
notions of risk in business and traces the evolution of critical writing on the subject. Through this review it 
identifies and examines a series of ideas which permit the development of a clear and concise definition. 
Chapter 4 applies the definition of risk to the political arena. It examines the unique nature of political 
risk, the literature on the subject, and the various definitions previously offered. . The goal os chapter 4 is to 
develop a practical definition for political risk consistent with the definition of risk developed in chapter 3. 
Chapter S examines the operational role of political risk in the foreign direct investment equation by 
examining the host - investor relationship. It focusses particularly on the attitudes of host countries toward outside 
investors, the characteristics of investment from an operational, or 'on the ground' standpoint, and the scope and 
·nature of the conflicts of ideas and interests which often, perhaps inevitably, arise between investors and their host 
country. 
1S. Prakash Sethi and K.A.N. Luther, "Political Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some 




What Is Risk? 
Risk can be seen as a chance, a probability, an unknown, an uncertainty, a gamble; it 
usually relates to a loss. But is risk the chance of the loss, the event which might cause the loss, 
tlie loss itself? 
More than seventy years ago, a young economics professor named Frank Knight wrote Risk, Uncertainty, 
and Profit, a groundbreaking work which attempted to explain, in terms somewhat more sophisticated and 
complete than those of Adam Smith (or Karl Marx, for that matter), why and how individuals make money in a 
vaguely free-market economic system. While much of the theory has been superseded (in some cases by Knight's 
own later work), the ideas Knight introduced remain landmarks in economics. Among those concepts, his 
treatment of risk, uncertainty, and their relationship has direct application to this subject. 
According to Knight, traditional economic definitions of risk always center around the possibility of loss: 
A condition of risk exists when a loss may, but is not certain to, occur. Given this, Knight identifies three 
conditions of existence in economics: that of the known, where there is no risk (risk requires doubt, so a certain 
loss is not a risk); that of 'known risk,' where the precise probability of a loss is known or can be determined; and 
that of "a unique kind of risk, which is not susceptible to measurement." 1 For the moment, these three conditions 
will be called certainty, riskk (for known risk), and risk.. (for 'unknown' risk). Generic risk -- simply the 
possibility of loss - will be known as riskg. 
Certainty is a unique and absolute situation, but as a concept, because it only refers to absolute fact, it has 
very little explanatory value in any business consideration. The differentiation between riskk and ris~, on the 
other hand, is crucial in business applications. "If the actuarial chance [the probability] of gain or loss in any 
transaction is ascertainable, ... the burden of bearing the risk can be avoided by" using insurance -- grouping cases 
1Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Reprint Edition (London: London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 1940 [Original publication: Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921]), 
pp. 45-48. Please note that Knight acknowledges the "unique kind of risk" can be represented by a mathematically 
precise probability theoretically; the problem is practically such a risk is not measurable. One could conclude that 
all risks (even all possibilities) are, in theory, specific probabilities at any discrete time, regardless of whether or 
not they are by nature measurable. R.J. Rummel and David A. Heenan, "How Multinational Analyze Political 
Risk," in Douglas N. Dickson (ed.), Managing Effectively In the World Marketplace (New York: Harvard Business 
Review and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1983), p. 382. 
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and determining sums to be set aside for each case such that their total will equal the value of any losses which will 
occur in the aggregate. Through insurance, "a single situation involving a known risk [which] may be regarded as 
'uncertain' .. .is easily converted into effective certainty. "2 Once certainty has been approximated, risk has been 
eliminated from the given situation. 
Knight identifies two ways of calculating probabilities for riskk: a priori calculations (risk3P) of known 
factors and statistical calculations (riskJ based on empirical observations of actual e:\.1Jerience. The former method 
is applicable only when exact probabilities can be known, but any specific outcome cannot; a situation "practically 
never met with in business." Statistical probabilities are definitionally less precise and most useful within a large 
aggregate. A simple example is fire insurance: Given all the relevant characteristics for a specific building, an 
actuary, through the application of figures gathered from actual experience with similar buildings, can calculate a 
, probability of the likelihood it will bum sufficiently accurate to support the commercial sale of insurance. 3 
Even risks is a relatively rare condition in business. Most business decisions are completely unique and 
therefore exist under the condition of risku. This is due to ignorance or to the perception of instability (where 
whatever knowledge is held would be believed to have little applicable value). Ignorance results from either a lack 
of knowledge (the decision maker does not know) or a lack of information (the decision maker cannot know).4 
Decisions made under such conditions can be only intuitive estimates and judgments. Knight recognizes such 
judgments tend to be expressed as ratios or proper fractions and therefore appear similar to the two types of riskk; 
however, they are different. Riskap is a mathematical calculation of fact based on an "absolutely homogeneous 
classification of instances completely identical" and risks is a statistical evaluation of 'associational frequency' 
based "on an empirical classification of instances," but risku is an intuitive judgment in which "there is no valid 
basis of any kind for classifying instances." It is simply an "estimate of an estimate." Knight suggests that should 
2Knight, op. cit., p. 46. 
3Jbid., pp. 214-216. 
4Yair Aharoni, The Foreign Investment Decision Process (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School 
of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1966), p. 37. 
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such an 'opinion' be confused for calculated fact. the results would be "meaningless" and could be "fatally 
misleading. "5 
Preliminary Conclusions 
As shown in exhibit 3.1, Knight's three conditions of knowledge can be conceived of as a ladder of 
cognition which can be 'climbed' through conversion to, or approximation of, a higher 'rung.' Conversion can be 
accomplished through insurance while approximation requires the ability to calculate a probability with the same 
accuracy required at the higher level. 










Unmeasurable Risk [ris~} 
Judged -
Risk!!I?-----
Calculated a priori 
Risks--------
Calculated statistically 
In a business decision making process, possible results of a decision could be laid out in a probability 
distribution -- a listing with a discrete probability of occurrence assigned to each possible result. The probability of 
risk (risk
8
, some generic harm to the organization) would be represented by the sum of the probabilities of 
occurrence of 'risky' results. Confidence in the accuracy of the probability distribution would vary depending upon 
the condition on the ladder of cognition under which the calculation of the probabilities was made. 6 Confidence 
5Knight, op. cit., pp. 223-227 and 231. 
6While the scenario is original and the terminology has been chosen to minimize the possibility of 
confusion, the basic idea is adapted from Aharoni, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
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should be high in a decision made under conditions approximating certainty and low in a decision made solely on 
an intuitive basis. The word 'should' is used because confidence is a purely nonnative concept, representing only a 
decision maker's perception of a situation and not any objective evaluation. 
Additional conclusions which can be drawn at this point include: 
• There are conditions of knowledge in the making of business decisions. 
• As these conditions are hierarchical and not overlapping, ~ey constitute a ladder of cognition up which a 
case can be moved if it sufficiently approximates a higher condition. 
• Risk is the condition where the possibility (but not certainty) of harm or loss to a business exists and can 
be eliminated either by making harm or loss certain (as opposed to merely possible) or impossible. 
• In those cases where there is neither certainty nor the ability to approximate certainty, decisions cannot be 
the result solely of objective reasoning. They must be subjective and intuitive judgments based on 
knowledge which, by definition, is incomplete. 
Applications 
As useful as Knight's ideas are, they are not sufficient for direct application to the problem of political risk 
in foreign direct investment. Because FDI decisions tend to be truly unique in a myriad of ways, and therefore to 
provide little reliable opportunity to apply experience gained from prior observation, it is rarely possible to derive a 
meaningful probability for riskg in either specific cases or the aggregate. 7 This makes it virtually impossible to 
determine statistically a rate of return on investment with accuracy sufficient to guarantee the coverage of all costs, 
including those accruing from risk, and leave sufficient profit to make the investment worthwhile. 8 
Aharoni attempts to deal with this application problem by focussing on the behavior of decision makers. 
He identifies four conditions of knowledge which approximate those established by Knight: certainty; assumed 
certainty, when "the decision maker behaves as if he has the full information;" risk, when "the decision maker 
knows the problem and its alternatives, and can state the probabilities of each one of the consequences;" and 
uncertainty (ris~).9 He identifies the intuitive or subjective estimate of a 'probability' of a ris~ as "a measure of a 
7 Aharoni, op. cit., p. 17. 
8Jbid., pp. 250-251. 
9/bid., pp. 16-17. N.B.: Although assumed certainty and risk are not the same as riskap and risks 
respectively, both sets are divisions of riskk and fill similar positions in the ladder of cognition. 
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degree of belief about the relative occurrence of events" rather than actual likelihood. 10 Aharoni's ideas, along 
with those outlined in the following paragraphs, are shown in exhibit 3.2. 
EXHIBIT 3.2: THE LADDER OF COGNITION 
Knight Aharoni Kobrin Shubik 
Certainty Certainty Certainty not mentioned 
Known Known Known 
Objective 
Assumed Probability 
Risk~ Certainty [risk~ 
Calculated Behavioral Calculated 
a priori Objective a priori 
Risk [riskkl Uncertainty 
Calculated Calculated Subjective 
Risks Risk Probability 
Calciilated Behavioral Calculated 
Generic statistically 
Risk [ riskgl Subjective 
Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Unmeasurable Uncertainty Judged Judged 
Risk [ris~L CriskuL_ 
Judged Judged Complete 
Uncertainty not mentioned 
Cannot be 
evaluated 
In his literature review of political risk, Kobrin also goes back to Knight for the basics of risk and 
uncertainty. He refers to riskk as objective uncertainty, where 'objective' refers to the manner in which the 
probabilities of such an uncertainty can be calculated. He also divides risku into two parts: subjective 
uncertainty, about which.there is some knowledge but not enough to make it riskk;* and complete uncertainty, 
about which there is no information whatsoever. The last grouping needs to be recognized so it can be dismissed 
as an area of inquiry; it is not possible to work in a knowledge vacuum. 11 
IOJbid., pp. 275-276. 
*"Uncertainty is subjective in the sense that opinions about the relative likelihood of events are based upon 
perceptions that are afunction of the available information, previous experience and individual cognitive processes 
which synthesize both into an imagined future." Kobrin (1985(1979}), op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
11/bid. 
-
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Writing in the early 1980s, Shubik reasserts the importance of differentiating between methods of 
calculating probabilities. Those calculated a priori are labelled objective; those calculated in other ways, 
subjective. Subjective probability is not the same as ris~, but would embrace it. Shubik says anything not 
absolute requires some measure of judgment and therefore cannot be properly considered objective. Since "the 
assignment of subjective probabilities can come about casually or after much thought, research, and calculation," 
actuarial-style statistical calculations would be included.12 
"Climbing the Ladder" 
Kobrin suggests two additional ways for certainty to be approximated on the ladder of cognition: 
1. When the known probability for one specific outcome is overwhelmingly dominant, certainty has been 
'approximated,' even in the absence of other information. 
2. Where environmental change is so gradual and progressive• as to be predictable, any outcome dependent 
on the environment may become 'certain' long enough before its arrival to be an effective 
approximation. 13 
Kobrin also asserts that under specific circumstances, cases in a condition of uncertainty can also 
approximate one of the riskk conditions (and therefore certainty, if they meet the criteria of the methods already 
reviewed). If all possible outcomes are known, or if there is at least sufficient knowledge to identify meaningful 
probabilities such that the probability of a known outcome is overwhelmingly dominant, and there is sufficient 
knowledge about the nature and consequences of known possible outcomes to know how they will effect the 
business, it may be possible to minimize the role of subjective judgment in decision making to such an e).1ent that 
12Martin Shubik, "Political Risk: Analysis, Process, and Purpose," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing 
International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 132-133. 
*This term is not to be read as value laden. It does not refer to the name, ideals, nor platform of any 
political party, nor is it normative in its suggestion of any goals or results toward which 'progress' is being made. 
In this context, the word strictly refers to a pattern of change which occurs with regularity in a logical fashion, 
building upon itself step by step, and which is therefore vaguely predictable. Unless specifically noted, this and 
similar terms shall always be used in accordance with general, non-political, etymologically based definitions. 
13Stephen 1. Kobrin, "Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and 
Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1979]), p. 133. 
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objectivity has been approximated. Kobrin implies success in this effort would result in meaningful quantification 
where it was previously impossible and therefore facilitate standard statistical business planning. 14 
The primary inadequacy of the Kobrin approach is that the set of characteristics required for uncertainty 
to sufficiently approximate riskk is so narrow a large number of cases remain the realm of pure intuition. For this 
reason, a proposition is offered that the condition of uncertainty can be subdivided in three: 
Uncertainty1 can approximate one of the conditions of riskk through the Kobrin method and is therefore 
quantifiable uncertainty; 
Uncertainty2 consists of those cases about which sufficient information exists to permit the systematic development 
of knowledge about possible occurrences and consequences as is true with quantifiable uncertainty, but for 
which specific probabilities cannot be calculated; such cases would exist under a condition of non-
quantifiable uncertainty;* 
Uncertainty3 is that remainder ofKobrin's original condition of subjective uncertainty and would retain the title. 
The utility of, this proposition, as shown in exhibit 3.3, is that while subjective uncertainty (as redefined) 
can only be evaluated through the application of intuition, cases of non-quantifiable uncertainty could conceptually 
(if in fact, such cases can be shown to exist) be evaluated in a systematic (and therefore more objective) fashion and 
could approximate certainty through the use of non-financial self insurance as defined in chapter 2. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has established a number of specific conclusions which lead to a functional definition of risk: 
• There are many cognitive .conditions in which specific cases of potential riskg can exist. 
• In order to achieve, convert to, or approximate certainty, a case must be susceptible to accurate 
quantification. 
• There are methods through which quantification can be simulated and cases existing in one condition of 
knowledge can be treated as if they existed in another condition "higher" on the ladder of cognition. 
14/bid., pp. 133-134. 
*It seems reasonable to assume that if Shubik were evaluating this proposition, he would place the 
categories of quantifiable and non-quantifiable uncertainty under the heading of subjective probability. 
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. EXlfIBIT 3.3: THE LADDER OF COGNITION 
Knight Aharoni ·Kobrin Shubik Proposition 
Certainty Certainty · Certainty not mentioned Certainty 
Known Known Known Known 
Objective 
Assumed Probability Objective 
Ris~ Certainty · Cris~ Probability 
Cal ·ated Behavioral Cal ated Calculated 
Risk a priori Objective a priori a priori 
[riskkL_ Uncertaintt 
Calciilated Calculated Statistical 
Subjective Probability 
Risks Risk Probabilitt [risksL-





Risk [riskgl calculatable 
Non-
Subjective quantifiable 
Uncertaii:ttv Uncertaintv Uncertaintv 
Judged Judged Systematical 
judged 
Unmeasurable Uncertainty Subjective 
Risk [riskyL ~L__ Uncertafotv 
Judged Judged Intuitively 
judged 
Complete not Complete 
Uncertainty mentioned Uncertainty 
Cannot be Cannot be 
evaluated evaluated 
• Where certainty cannot be approximated, perfectly objective evaluation is not possible and any judgment 
must be based, at least in part, on subjective or intuitive evaluation. 
• Risk requires uncertainty, the possibility of loss, and ignorance or perceived ignorance, of relevant 
information. 
Therefore, 
Risk is the possibility of unexpected harm or loss accruing to a business due to real or perceived 
ignorance. It can be mitigated through some form of quantification or it cannot be objectively 
evaluated. 
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Since quantification pennits at least the approximation of certainty and risk requires uncertainty, risk "defies direct 
quantification" as the first part of the first hypothesis asserted would be the case for political risk. 
Chapter4 
Risk In the Political Context 
"When businessmen talk about risk, they use this word to include both the subjective 
probability of loss, either in absolute terms or in relation to some expectations, and the amount 
the company may lose. The loss referred to may be a monetary one, or the waste of management 
time, or the inability to achieve a specific objective of the company other than profits (e.g. risk of 
losing control). Thus, when a businessman says 'the political risks abroad are high,' he may be 
referring to the possibility of losing his freedom of decision making because of a high degree of 
government regulation. Political risks may mean to him a high subjective probability of total or 
partial loss of the investment itself because of expropriation, nationalization, or war; they may 
mean that the unsettled conditions put the very basis of planning in question and make the work 
of management more difficult; or they may be any combination of all these factors." 1 
As considered in chapter 3, the concept of risk, if not simple, is reasonably straightforward. Risk in the 
political context, however, is far more complex. This complexity has many sources and examining them is 
complicated by connotative problems surrounding the understanding of the political context itself. 
Kobrin sees the biggest connotative problem to be the common assumption that political risk must stem 
from major political discontinuities. This false assumption often leads multinational enterprises (MNEs) to focus 
on the possibility of a political 'earthquake' -- a relatively rare occurrence -- and overlook more likely possibilities 
which "tend to be both less dramatic [in nature] and more e~1ensive [in potential effect]. "2 Another difficulty is the 
misconception that risk is an entirely negative thing. "Risks and opportunities are two sides of the same coin. 113 A 
missed opportunity -the loss of a chance to increase profits, assets, turnover, or market share -- can be as harmful 
to an organization in the long term as a decrease in real performance. Too narrow a focus on the potential 
1Yair Aharoni, The Foreign Investment Decision Process (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School 
ofBusiness Administration, Harvard University, 1966), p. 37. 
2Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Assessment by International Firms: Models or Methodologies?" Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 3, Part 2 (1981), pp. 252-253. 
3Jean Boddewyn and Etienne F. Cracco, "The Political Game in World Business," Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January-February, 1972), p. 45. This idea is also discussed in William Ascher 
and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting: Political Risk and Economic Opportunity (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. 10. 
31 
Chapter 4 Risk In the Political Context 32 
'downside' of a risk event can blind an organization to opportunities and thereby increase its likelihood of loss from 
such 'risk.•* 
The first generation definitions of political risk. were merely descriptive and therefore not very useful for 
understanding the nature of political risk and the ways in which it can effect MNEs. The landmark second 
generation definition of political risk was laid down by Stefan Robock. ** It acknowledges the complexities of the 
subject and reflects an effort to develop a framework of understanding which meets both the theoretical 
requirements of academia and the practical requirements of international business. For these reasons, Robock's 
approach has provided the base from which others have worked in refining definitions, and therefore provides a 
useful foundation for this work. 




discontinuities occur in the business environment, 
they are difficult to anticipate, and 
they result from political change. 
"To constitute a 'risk' these changes in the business environment must have a potential for significantly 
affecting the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise. "4 
Robock adds four caveats: 
I. Not all political change affects the business environment; therefore, not all political change can constitute 
political risk; 
2. What may be a political risk for one business may not affect others [political risk tends to be specific or 
selective in nature]; 
3. Where political change is gradual and predictable ['progressive' as outlined earlier], such change 
approximates a status quo and therefore d~s not represent a political risk. 
4. Political risk is not found only in the developing world, it is "pervasive" and can also affect business in the 
industrialized world and in MNEs's home countries.5 
*Several MNEs operating in Chile, for. example, chose to leave the country after the 1970 election of 
President Salvador Allende (even though they were permitted to remain) because they felt· his left-wing 
government might lead to economic and political disaster. In fact, the business environment did deteriorate 
drastically, but this helped trigger a military coup which resulted in vastly improved business conditions for MNEs 
which chose to remain. 
**Sometimes collaborating with Kenneth Simmonds, Robock wrote a series of articles published in the 
Columbia Journal of World Business in 1970 and 1971 and later incorporated into their international business 
textbook. 
4Stefan H. Robock and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), p. 356. 
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Robock's definition also has four noteworthy and valuable characteristics: 
• It requires that political risk ''be thought of as a peril (cause ofloss) rather than a unique loss exposure," 
permitting each effect to be measurable on a universal scale -- that of finance. 6 
• It differentiates between environment and organization by identifying and distinguishing between risk 
events -environmental phenomena which have the potentially hannful consequences •• and risk effects -
- organizational phenomena which are the harmful consequences themselves. 7 
• It analytically links conceptual sources of political risk -- independent variables such as political 
philosophies, armed conflicts, or social unrest - to dependent variables - the risk events (government 
regulation, a strike) and their effects on MNEs. 8 
• It identifies the role of sudden or discontinuous change in political risk. While there tends to be a simple, 
negative correlation between political risk and the predictability of environmental change,9 the nature of 
risk is not ine:\.tricably tied to this condition. Once instability exists in the environment, the nature of risk 
is most closely linked to the predictability of the final outcome of a series of events. Therefore, the 
existence of a gradual and predictable series of intermediate events will not necessarily lower. risk. 10 
As useful as Robock's approach is to understanding the operational components of political risk, it also 
has some significant shortcomings. Its tendency to tie risk effects to specific sources and groups is deterministic 
and limiting. While there are trends in the manifestation of risk, there are few limits; many potential risk effects 
5Jbid., pp. 355-357. Overholt points out that "the rules of the economic game are established everywhere 
by political decision." The developing world arguably may have the most dramatic developments, but political risk 
can be just as dangerous elsewhere. William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 
1982), p. 16. ' 
. 6Norman A. Baglini, Global Risk Management: How U.S. Corporations Manage Foreign Risks (Risk 
Management Society Publishing, Inc., 1983), p. 62. 
7David A. Schmidt, "Analyzing Political Risk," Business Horizons, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July/August, 1986), p. 
44. 
8Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., p. 358 and pp. 362-368. A late 1970s study ofFDI by Kobrin and others 
found evidence that the event/effect differentiation and the variable linkage, both theoretical concepts developed to 
help depict the political risk equation, are genuine phenomena found in the FDI environment. Stephen J. Kobrin, 
"When Does Political Instability Result in Increased Investment Risk?" Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 
XIII, No. 3 (Fall, 1978), p. 120. 
9Jbid., p.114 and Attila Yaprak and Keith T. Sheldon, "Political Risk Management in Multinational 
Firms: An Integrative Approach," Management Decision, Vol. 22, Pt. 6 (1984), p. 54. 
10Stephen J. Kobrin; "Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and 
Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1979]), p. 131. 
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"can arise from a variety of sources and be generated by a number of different groups." 11 A related complaint 
raised by Sethi and Luther is that the Robock construction appears to draw the line for understanding risk at the 
description of the source. This may be sufficient if financial insurance is to be used for protection, but for non-
.financial self insurance, it is "not very useful. A business entity needs to have an understanding of the sources of 
risk to take a proactive stand against such risks or initiate measures to contain them." 12 
The Third Generation of Definitions 
In his extensive literature review of the field of political risk, Kobrin identifies a third type of definition 
for the term. More sophisticated, more useful, and rarer, these definitions differentiate between uncertainty and 
risk in terms similar to those discussed in chapter 3. They explicitly recognize a specific set of information about 
which there must be knowledge in order to identify, assess, and manage the risk. I>J 
Friedman and Kim offer one such approach by defining political risk as "business risk brought about by 
political sources or environment."14 In this approach, traditional business risk (B or beta risk) is a systematically 
derived, quantified aggregate of financial and related factors and political risk is _ (alpha) risk -- all unsystematic 
or 'non-business' risk.15 
An alternative is offered by Grosse and Stack who adapt the concept of country risk as used in 
international banking.16 Country risk is the possibility that a bank will make a loss on a loan made to a foreign 
11 Jeffrey D. Simon, "Political Risk Assessment: Past Trends and Future Prospects," Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Fall, 1982), pp. 62-64. 
12S. Prakash Sethi and K.A.N. Luther, "Political Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some 
Problems of Definition and Measurement," California Management Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), p. 
59. 
13Kobrin (1985[1979]), op. cit., pp. 130-131. 
14Roberto Friedman and Jonghoon Kim, "Political Risk and International Marketing," Columbia Journal 
of World Business, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (Winter, 1984), p. 64. 
15Joseph Micallef, "Political Risk Assessment," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XVI, No. 2 
(Summer, 1981), p. 47. 
16Robert Grosse and John Stack, "Non-Economic Risk Evaluation in Multinational Banks," Management 
International Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1984), pp. 41-42. 
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country. It is divided into economic and non-economic types by differentiating between the questions of ability and 
willingness to service a debt. 17 Although willingness to service a debt is not as broad a concern as those faced by 
MNEs with full-scale operations in a foreign country, it still requires recognition of "the character of social and 
political relations in the country in question." 18* 
The Stages of Political Risk 
The difference between uncertainty and risk can, as noted in chapter 3, be observed by an analyst through 
the application of the ladder of cognition. In order to observe the differentiation between risk events and risk 
effects, an analyst must conceive of political risk as a two stage process. First, an analyst must ask, "what events 
will occur in a given environment in the future?" Second, "how will a given event affect the organization, either 
internally or in its relationship with its operating environment?"19 In an operational situation, both of these 
sample questions would actually be requests for probabilities -- the probability of a given event occurring and, 
given the occurrence, the probability of it affecting the firm generally and/or having specific consequences. 2o 
The first stage, a determination of environmental risk, can be handled in the abstract -- it is essentially a 
matter of political forecasting. The second stage, a determination of organizational risk, requires "a value 
assessment of the importance of [an effect] to the concerned corporation ... in the context of a specific goal structure. 
17Patrick Foley, "Country Risk Assessment," Country Risk Analysis, A Euromoney Conference (London: 
Euromoney Seminar Transcripts, June 10-11, 1987), p. 4. 
18John Dunn, "Country Risk: Social and Cultural Aspects," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing 
International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 139-141. 
*It may be interesting to note, however, that political risk - the willingness question - did not seem to be 
very important to international bankers ... at least not several years ago. At a 1987 conference on country risk 
analysis, the subject of non-economic country risk was raised several times by speakers, but despite numerous panel 
discussions and question and answer sessions, political issues were never raised by anyone in an audience filled 
with international bankers. The entire focus of the audience was on the question of economic stability. Euromoney, 
Country Risk Analysis, A Euromoney Conference (London: Euromoney Seminar Transcripts, June 10-11, 1987). 
19The concept of the "organization-environment interface" comes from Friedman and Kim, op. cit., p. 64. 
20Kobrin (Fall, 1978), op. cit., p. 114. 
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It cannot be assessed independently. "21 The ladder of cognition can ~ used for both stages since each requires the 
assignment of probabilities for accurate evaluation should such probabilities be determinable. But in order to 
approximate certainty in the whole process, and thereby effectively eliminate all risk, certainty must exist or be 
approximated for each stage (a chain is only as strong as its weakest link). If this cannot be accomplished, there 
still exists a need for subjective judgment about uncertainty. 
An analytic toot for examining the two stages of political risk is offered in exhibit 4.1. It is a schematic 
representation of the series of relationships between abstract events in the political environment and their discrete 
effects on organizations. This equation has both a causal flow and an explicit structure. 22 The structure 
represents the manner in which 'risky' environmental situations or events become operational by creating effects 
which manifest themselves upon an organization as specific, concrete final results. 23 
EXHIBIT 4.1 A SCHEMA TIC REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL RISK 
EQUATION 
Political Risk 
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 
Environmental Risk Organizational Risk 
Condition Condition ORGANIZATION 
POLITICAL in 
-7 under Ladder -7 of ENVIRONMENT Cognition 
RISK 
produces 



















Can the political environment be considered distinct from the economic, financial, social, legal, cultural, 
and whatever other environments one might be able to identify? Surely, at a practical level, it cannot. Reality 
21Shubik, op. cit., p. 134. 
22 Although the , general concept of the exhibit is original, it is influenced by numerous wntmgs, 
particularly Kobrin (1981), op. cit. In addition, the specific concept of a .causal flow of occurrences embodied 
within the exhibit is adapted from Grosse and Stack, op. cit., p. 52. 
23Kobrin (1981), op. cit., p. 267. 
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lacks the clear indicators which in theoretical constructions demarcate boundaries between 'environments.' But for 
the purposes of analysis, some type of boundaries will be useful. Considering the practical, applicative nature of 
this inquiry, the most useful boundaries will be those which approximate divisions already recognized in business 
and are as general as possible while still retaining utility. 
The existing differentiation between a. and 6 risk is a useful place to start. 6 risk is a riskk in the ladder of 
cognition because it is made up of variables which can be accurately measured at a fixed point at a given time. If 
all such factors were grouped into what could be called the static environment, it would leave a dynamic 
environment, filled with factors which are not fixed and cannot be measured and therefore would exist under a 
condition of risku. 
The 'political environment' in the case ofFDI does not equate perfectly with this dynamic environment as 
defined. For the purpose of forecasting - a major part of risk analysis -- there are areas in the static environment , 
where political knowledge could be extremely helpful; but at the less holistic and more basic level of current 
situation assessment, the differentiation holds. Likewise, there will be dynamic situations where political factors 
will be no more than tangential. But in any dynamic situation, societal knowledge of the host country, which by its 
very nature must be at least somewhat political, will be valuable. 
Conclusions 
• Political risk must be considered as a cause of loss rather than a loss itself because with the possibility of 
negative effects from political risk comes concomitant positive opportunity. 
• Political risk requires sudden discontinuous change, but the change need not be major or cataclysmic, 
merely unexpected. 
• There are two stages in the political risk equation -- the independent risk event and the dependent risk 
effect - which link at the interface between the political environment and the organization at risk. Each 
stage can be analyzed separately through application of the ladder of cognition. 
• The political environment is a fluid, poorly bounded concept, but can be viewed as roughly analogous to 
the 'dynamic' environment when the latter is differentiated from the 'static' environment incorporating 
quantifiable business (6) risk. 
Therefore, 
Political risk is an independent variable in business existing under a condition of non-quantifiable, 
subjective, or complete uncertainty. 
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All other things being equal - assuming all 6 risk has been effectively dealt with - political risk is the primary 
factor detennining the operational profitability of a foreign direct investment. 
As asserted in the second part of the first hypothesis, political risk "can be explained as a series of discrete 
elements which can be analyzed separately." Furthennore, through the use of the ladder of cognition, analysis can 
show that political risk as a whole "defies quantification." Therefore, chapters 3 and 4 have supported the first 
hypothesis: 
"If political risk is properly understood as a phenomenon of the political environment, then it a) defies 
direct quantification and b) can be explained as a series of discrete elements which can be analyzed 
separately." 
Political Risk Insurance 
"Broadly defined by the private insurance market, political risk is an arbitrary and 
capricious act of a foreign government that would adversely affect the contracts or investments of 
companies or finns carrying on business either within those countries or with public entities, 
corporations or finns in those countries. However, it can also be an act, usually reactive, of one's 
own [home] government in relation to the same kinds of businesses. 1124 
The ability to convert riskk to effective certainty through grouping cases has already been discussed. This 
is one aspect of commercial political risk insurance. But in fact, virtually any conceivable political risk can be 
insured against, even if accurate probabilities of occurrence cannot be determined and cannot therefore be grouped 
by actuarial calculation. 25 
In the insurance industry, risk is either pure or speculative. Two things make the differentiation: pure 
risk is that with a potential for loss only -- a fire or disaster, for instance -- and for which probabilities of 
occurrence are known or can be actuarially calculated; speculative risks have the potential for both gain and/or loss 
and are too unique by nature for their probabilities to be calculable. Typically, businesses are interested in insuring 
24Ray Antes, "Political Risk: Private Insurance Market," Country Risk Analysis, A Euromoney 
Conference (London: Euromoney Seminar Transcripts, June 10-11, 1987), p. 127. 
25Philip J. Stein, "Should Your Firm Invest in Political Risk Insurance," Financial Executive, Vol. LI, 
No. 3 (March, 1983), p. 18. 
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against pure risk and insurers sell only pure risk coverage, but in the political risk market, there is both demand for 
and supply of speculative insurance. 26 
Speculative insurance is not a calculated risk in the traditional sense, but an unmitigated gamble with no 
clear odds. Therefore, "there is no objective way to assess the fairness of the insurance premium." Given this, the 
conversion of subjective uncertainty to insurance is the trade of one risk for another - the risk that too much is 
being paid for protection -- and cannot automatically constitute an approximation of certainty. 27 
26David B. Hertz and Howard Thomas, Risk AnaZvsis and its Applications (Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1983), p. 9. 
27 Aharoni, op. cit., p. 277. 
Chapter 5 
Sources and Manifestations of Political Risk 
"The crux of the problem lies in the very nature of the multinational enterprise, namely 
its ability to think in terms that extend beyond a single country and to use resources located in 
more than one jurisdiction. These characteristics are seen as a threat by government leaders bent 
on full control, by local businessmen aspiring to compete, and by intellectuals hoping to overturn 
the status quo." 1 
"Public officials are charged with the responsibility of meeting social and economic 
goals, the desirability of which can be measured in political terms. Through the exercise of 
public policy, host governments attempt to influence the behavior of foreign firms in order to 
shape the domestic environment and meet national objectives. "2 
This chapter applies the abstract work of chapters 3 and 4 to the real world. It provides an introduction to 
the major actors in the political environment of foreign direct investment (FDI), a brief review of their ideological, 
political, and practical motivations for action, and provides some examples of ways in which their actions can 
affect the affiliates of multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
Among the most important tools in the academic study of political risk are classification schemes for such 
risk. Friedman and Kim have identified three categories of schema -- classification by: 
• the nature of selectivity of the risk; 
• types of actors creating the risk; and 
• elements of organizations affected or targeted by the risk. 3 
The most useful of such schemes for this chapter is Robock's differentiation between macro and micro 
risks. In the simplest sense, macro-political risk affects all foreign owned enterprise within a country while 
micro-political risk affects some subset of the whole. 4 Macro risk tends to be the result of major events and to 
1Raymond Vernon, "The Multinational Enterprise: Power Versus Sovereignty," in Raymond Vernon, The 
Economic and Political Consequences of Multinational Enterprise: An Anthology (Boston: Division of Research, 
Graduate School-of Business, Harvard University, 1972 [Article originally published in 197l]c), p. 153. 
2David A. Schmidt, "Analyzing Political Risk," Business Horizons, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July/August, 1986), p. 
43. 
3Roberto Friedman and Jonghoon Kim, "Political Risk and International Marketing," Columbia Journal 
of World Business, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (Winter, 1984), pp. 66-67. 
4Stefan H. Robock and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), pp. 359-362. 
40 
Chapter 5 Sources and Manifestations of Political Risk 41 
affect the safety of physical assets and the ability to recover investment costs. Micro risk tends to be caused by 
smaller and more easily overlooked events and to affect freedom of operation and the ability to generate cash flow 
and profit. 5 
The writer suggests another way of classifying political risk which might be helpful for this chapter. 
Risks are either intentional or unintentional in nature. The determining factor is whether they stem from events 
triggered with the intention of putting one or more MNE affiliates at risk. Unintentional risk may be the result of 
unpremeditated environmental events, premeditated environmental events not related to issues of FDI, or 
unintended secondary effects of such events. 
Actors 
The two major classes of actor in the first stage of political risk in FDI are the host government and other 
• 
host country groups and individuals in dependent of the host government. 6 The government generally operates 
through legislation and regulation, while independent internal actors use disruptive action and public opinion to 
provoke risk events. 
Another internal actor, frequently overlooked, is the host country bureaucracy. 7 Administrative or 
bureaucratic risk generally manifests itself in an MNE's inability to understand the structure and functioning of the 
public sector (transparency risk), difficulty in predicting administrative decisions because of the lack of a 
"standard practice" (regularity risk), and bureaucratic operations which fall out of the realm of "standard 
5William P. Kelly, "Political Risk Assessment: Half the Equation," in Jerry Rogers (ed.), Global Risk 
Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), p. 157 and Charles W. Hofer 
and Teriy P. Haller, "GLOBESCAN: A Way to Better International Risk Assessment," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel 
.and Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1980)), pp. 150-151. 
6Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., p. 358. 
7Michael Z. Brooke and H. Lee Remmers, The International Firm: A Study of Management Across 
Frontiers - Trade and Investment (London: Pitman Publishing Limited, 1977), p. 6. 
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administrative procedure" as experienced by MNEs in other places (functional risk). 8 It is a matter of 
bureaucratic willingness to accept and accommodate an investment. 
Other actors are external. Through their regulatory and legislative powers, home governments can play a 
significant role in political risk, often based on their relationship with host· govemrnents.9 Horne country 
nongovemment organizations can also have influence through actions they take which affect parent MNEs. Events 
in third countries, especially those neighboring the host country, can also influence FDI operations. IO Finally, 
direct or indirect intervention by 'supranational' groups also can generate political risk. The policies of 
organizations from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT) or the United Nations and its myriad of 
agencies, through the development oriented International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, down to regional associations like the European Community or the 
Organization of African Unity can all have significant, ugexpected effects on the ability of affiliates to conduct 
business within host countries. 11 
Although each of these different sets of actors are independent of each other in the political environment, 
they are also interdependent, as actions by one to create a political risk event often prompts activity among 
others. 12 
8Udo Pretschker, "The Administrative Environment as Risk Factor for Direct Investments in Developing 
Countries," Management International Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1980), pp. 94-96. 
9Derek F. Channon with Michael Jalland, Multinational Strategic Planning (London: MacMillan Press 
Ltd., 1979), pp. 239-240, Patrick Crow, "Political Risks," Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 84, No. 19 (May 12, 1986), p. 
35, Stephen J. Kobrin, "The Political Environment," in Vern Terpstra, et. al., The Cultural Envirpnment of 
International Business (Cincinatti: South-Western Publishing Co., 1978.), pp. 231-233 and Hans SchOllharnrner 
and Douglas Nigh, "The Effect of Political Events on Foreign Direct Investments by German Multinational 
Corporations," Management International Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1984), pp. 26-33. 
10John Calverley, Country Risk Analysis (London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1985), p. 128 
and Suleiman K. Kassicieh and Jamal R. Nassar, "Political Risk in the Gulf: The Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on 
Governments and Multinational Corporations," California Management Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter, 
1986), pp. 73-78. 
llChannon and Jalland, op. cit., p. 240. 
12S. Prakash Sethi and K.A.N. Luther, "Political Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some 
Problems of Definition and Measurement," California Management Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), p. 
59. 
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Motivations 
As established in chapter 1, there is significant potential for conflicts of interest between host countries 
and MNEs. Many of.the conflicts are rooted in the gap between the needs ofMNEs and the available resources of 
host countries. Particularly in developing countries, poor conditions can make investment less attractive to MNEs 
searching for lower costs but unwilling to sacrifice quality, flexibility, or other goals in exchange.13 Exhibit 5.1 is 
a list of many such incentives along with the views of policy makers in developing countries on their value in 
attracting MNE investment. 
Incentives are usually included in a concession or investment agreement between the government of the 
host country and the investing MNE. While these agreements are designed to minimize conflict and maximize 
understanding between the parties, the host country - MNE relationship is dynamic. Environmental conditions or 
the goals of the parties may change, the bargain may become obsolete, and at least one of the ~arties may feel 
cheated by the other in the investment relationship.14 
Additional potential sources of conflict and tension are host country fears of losing control of the FDI 
relationship or becoming dependent economically on MNEs. 15 Since investment is only attractive to the host 
country if more is gained from the investment than is lost to the investor and the losses are the lowest possible in 
order to achieve the gains, hosts need to protect their political and economic independence and retain a modicum 
of control over MNE business operations. I6 
13Harold Crookell, "Investing in Development -- A Corporate View, Columbia Journal of World Business, 
Vol. X, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 82-82, Yves L. Doz and C.K. Prahalad, "How MNCs Cope with Host 
Government Intervention," in Douglas N. Dickson (ed.), Managing Effectively Jn the World Marketplace (New 
York: Harvard Business Review and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1983), p. 46 and Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., p. 
207. 
14R Hal Mason, "Conflicts Between Host Countries and the Multinational Enterprise," California 
Management Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (Fall, 1974), p. 7. 
lSMason, op. cit., p. 4. 
16Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., p. 208 and Raymond Vernon, "Conflict and Resolution Between 
Foreign Direct Investors and Less Developed Countries," Public Policy, Vol. XVIII (Fall, 1968), pp. 334. 
.. 
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EXHIBIT 5.1: STEPS WHICH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MAY 
FOLLOW TO INTEREST MNEs* 
Steps 
Project an image of stability and reliability in the eyes of MNEs 
Guarantee no changes in the rate of taxation for a certain period of time 
Create confidence among MNEs about host government as one which 
lives up to its promises 
Invite discussions with MNEs prior to fixing rules which will affect 
business 
Circulate proposed regulations to all businesses in country before 
setting laws 
Spell out economic policies (at least those aspects which are relevant to 
MNEs) clearly and in objective terms 
Apply uniform rules to both domestic corporations and MNEs 
Clearly spell out any exceptions to the law or concessions which must 
be guaranteed to selected businesses to avoid a feeling of 
discrimination among MNEs 
Discover projects suitable to local conditions and make such projects 
known to MNEs 
Provide MNEs information on local market opportunities 
Determine MNE requirements for components and supplies which 
could be provided by existing business and inform MNEs 
Analyze comparative economic advantages for MNEs 
Bear (or share with MNE) the cost of investigating investment 
opportunities 
Assist MNEs in other ways during their on-the-spot investigation of an 
opportunity 
Help MNEs reduce risks by providing local currency loans 
Provide accelerated depreciation allowances on MNE investments 
Give 'loss rebates' to the extent of depreciation if profits do not cover 
the depreciation 
Provide incentives to MNEs which may increase their rate of return on 
investment 
Provide concessions to MNEs which may reduce capital costs 
Provide concessions to MNEs which reduce their production costs 
Provide perpetual incentives for MNEs rather than one-shot assistance 






















































*Taken from Subhash Jain and Yash Puri, "Role of Multinational Corporations in Developing Countries: 
Policy Makers' Views," Management International Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1981), p. 66. 
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There may also be concern about local firms being driven out of business by foreign-owned competition, 
the net loss of capital or foreign exchange through the repatriation of funds to parents, and the destruction of 
irreplaceable natural resources. 17 Yet another potential fear is that foreign-owned enterprises represent their home 
governments and will act on their behalf, or at least in their interests, instead· of in the interests of the government 
and people of the host country. 18 Exhibit 5.2 is Jain and Purl's list of some of these possible concerns and the 
feelings about them of policy makers in developing countries. 
Conflicts of interest are the prime reason there is latent hostility toward foreign ownership present in all 
countries. Robock argues the strength of this feeling is the determining factor for the amount and type of political 
risk an investor will face.19 Though free marketeers would argue MNEs are crucial to development and progress 
and rationally should not be met with hostility, the dependencia school of thought tends to view MNEs as a major 
part of the problems facing developing countries. Shaped by the personal ideologies of western educated, 
0 
charismatic leaders of the 'Third World,' dependencia is rooted in the concepts of Fabian socialism and Lenin's 
economic imperatives of imperialism and depicts MNEs as the last gasp of 'the metropole.'20 This is especially 
true in the case of former colonies where the colonial powers stifled development by forcing specialization in low-
margin primary commodities and limiting industrialization in order to protect their own economies from 
competition. 21 
17John D. Daniels and Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments and Operations, Fourth 
Edition (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 383-384. · 
18Raymond Vernon, "Multinational Enterprise and National Security," in Raymond Vernon, The 
Economic and Political Consequences of Multinational Enterprise: An Anthology (Boston: Division of Research, 
Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 1972 [Article originally published in 1971]b), pp. 113-116. 
19Robock and Simmonds, op. cit., pp. 362-363. 
20Eugene B. Mihaly, "The Multinational Corporation and Its Political Environment: Change and 
Survival," in S. Prakash Sethi and Richard H. Holton (eds.), The Management of Multinationals: Policies, 
Operations, and Research (Detroit, Michigan: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 
1974), p. 28 and Arvind V. Phatak, Managing Multinational Corporations (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 
1974), pp. 131-132. 
21Mason, op. cit., p. 9. 
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EXHIBIT 5.2: PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MNE OPERATIONS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* 
46 
Problems Nature of Response 
Capital Usage 
Use capital from local sources depriving domestic companies of needed 
funds 
Use of local capital frustrates some government development objectives 
Emphasis on short-term profitability does not serve host's best interests 
More interested in repatriating profits than investing them in growth 
Technology Usage 
Tend to use outdated technology 
Training 
Tend not to give local employees training neeged to make production 
process work 
Do not provide fair chance for national managers to move up in 
organization 
Economic Development 
Do not help host countries become economically self-sufficient 
Force host countries and local-owned industries to become economically 
dependent on them 
Help in planning economic development 
Help in solving unemployment problem 
Operations controlled by parent organizations with little concern for 
interests of host 
MNEs benefit more than host from investments 
Alignment 
Do not align themselves with new government policy statements which 
affect them 
Do not want to work with host in establishing new laws 
Comply only with letter oflaw, not spirit 
Are more difficult to control than domestic companies 
Frustrate government policies 
Parent's control of affiliate conflicts with host's economic development 
program 
Enforces parental policies of little relevance in host environment 
General Policies 
Conduct business with corrupt practices 
Have poor impact on local culture 
Do very little to promote labor welfare 
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The most severe political risk manifestation of dependencia is expropriation, particularly when not 
accompanied by compensation. Studies show expropriation is not simply the operationalization of an ideology but 
has been "used selectively as an instrument of economic policy"22 "in a rational and discriminating manner 
[f]ollowing the logic of the 'obsolescing bargain. 11123 
While extreme dependencia continues to shape the views of some groups, it has given way in most of the 
developing world to what has been called the "Vernonian reality" ofFDI: the need to bargain.24 The goal of the 
bargain "is to dissociate the boon of the resources that accompany direct investment from the bane of foreign 
ownership inherent in such investment" without discouraging MNEs from investing. 25 This has led to what 
Moran calls "business-as-usual economic nationalism in the Third World (sic]. .. a more rational attempt by host 
authorities, to paraphrase Samuel Gompers, 'to get more. 11126 
Political Risk Effects 
The most notorious effect of political risk on FDI is expropriation without compensation, but this has 
become increasingly rare in recent decades. It has been replaced largely by strategies of domestication or 
22Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Assessment by International Firms: Models or Methodologies?" Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 3, Part 2 (1981), p. 253. 
23John Dunn, "Country Risk: Social and Cultural Aspects," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing 
International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 143. 'Obsolescing bargain' refers to a 
contractual agreement between the host country and an investor which is no longer seen as suitable by one or both 
of the parties. The concept is discussed further in the next section of this chapter. 
24Adhip Chandhuri, "Multinational Corporations in Less-developed Countries: What Is In Store?" 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XXIII, No. l (Spring, 1988), p. 58. "Vernonian reality" refers to 
Raymond Vernon, one of the first and most influential business school professors to study political risk in FDI, 
who has written extensively on the nature of the MNE-host country "bargain." 
25Peter P. Gabriel, "MNCs in the Third World: Is Conflict Unavoidable?" in Managing the 
Multinationals: A Harvard Business Review Reprint Series (Boston: Harvard College, 1974 [Article originally 
published in 1972)), pp. 139-140. 
26Theodore H. Moran, "International Political Risk Assessment, Corporate Planning, and Strategies to 
Offset Political Risk," in Theodore H Moran (ed.), Multinational Corporations: The Political Economy of Foreign 
Direct Investment (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books -- D.C. Heath and Company, 1985), p. 108. 
----------------------------------- - ------
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'creeping expropriation;' "the gradual encroachment on the freedom to operate within the country. "27 From the 
host country's point of view, this approach can, by decree or through the offer of incentives, result in a larger role 
for and more control by nationals without sacrificing foreign expertise, capital, and technology.28 But from the 
MNE's point of view, the long-term effects can be just as devastating as outright expropriation - the complete loss 
of both assets and the ability to generate income for the parent without any form of compensation -- even though 
the slower process provides some measure of adjustment time.29 As shown in exhibit 5.3, there are a wide variety 
of domestication strategies available for use by host governments. 
The ultimate effects of political risk events on an MNE, whether they be the result of a domestication 
strategy or not, can be classified in numerous ways. Some writers look at effects in terms of assets --both tangible 
and intangible.30 Others view effects through the window of operation freedom. 31 Root developed a highly 
descriptive framework which has been adapted by many followers: 
"Transfer risks are the result of uncertainty* with respect to host government actions that restrict 
the transfer of capital, payments, products, technology, and persons into or out of the host country. 
Exchange controls and import restrictions (tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers) are the most notable types 
of transfer restrictions. 
"Operational risks are the result of uncertainty with respect to the policies, regulations, and 
administrative procedures of host governments that directly constrain the management and performance 
of local operations in production, marketing, finance, and other business functions. Monetary and fiscal 
policies, price controls, taxation, labor codes and regulations, local content requirements, and general 
administrative behavior fall into this category of political risk. 
27Philip R Cateora, "The Multinational Enterprise and Nationalism," MSU Business Topics, Vol. 19, No. 
2 (Spring, 1971), p. 52. 
281bid., pp. 52-53. 
29C. Richard Peterson, "Can Multinationals Survive in Today's World?" Risk Management, Vol. 28 
(February, 1981), p. 35. 
3°Norman A. Baglini, Global Risk Management: How U.S. Corporations Manage Foreign Risks (Risk 
Management Society Publishing, Inc., 1983), p. 62 and Martin Shubik, "Political Risk: Analysis, Process, and 
Purpose," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the 
Centenary of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 
113. 
31Frans G.J. Derkinderen, "Transnational Business Latitude in Developing Countries," Management 
International Review, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1982), p. 56 and Doz and Prahalad, op. cit., pp. 413-415. 
*In this usage, 'uncertainty' refers to any condition on the ladder of cognition which does not approximate 
certainty. 
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"Ownership-control risks are the result of uncertainty about government policies and actions with 
respect to ownership and/or effective managerial control of the local operations of an international 
company. This type of risk includes possible shifts in discriminatory treatment of foreign-owned 
enterprises, the reservation of certain industries to local nationals, the role of state enterprise, official 
requirements or pressures for joint ventures with nationals (including the host government), and 
expropriation policies. n32 
EXHIBIT 5.3: EXAMPLES OF HOST COUNTRY INTERVENTION OPTIONS* 
Affirmative action for local firms in public sector bidding 
Bureaucratic processes designed to control investors 
'Creeping' expropriation or 'domestication' 
Devaluation or revaluation of currency 
Embargoes and boycotts 
Export requirements 
Expropriation or nationalization 
Flow of funds restrictions (e.g.: dividends, royalties, interest payments, profit, repatriation) 
Foreign capital importation requirements 
Foreign exchange control (e.g.: convertibility) 
Government to government sales policies 
Hiring and firing constraints 
·Ideological changes 
Labor relations regulations 
Local content regulations 
Local education requirements (e.g.: technical, managerial) 
Locally shared ownership requirements 
Minimum local employment in managerial and technical positions 
Minimum local representation on board 
Non-tariff trade barriers (e.g.: regulations, subsidies) 
Price controls 
Production quotas 
Recognition of international trade barriers and constraints 
Refining and shipping requirements 
Reinvestment requirements 
Restrictive trade practices 
Sectors of economic activity reserved for host country nationals 
Social spending and involvement requirements (e.g.: housing, medical care) 
Tariff trade barriers 
Taxes 
Unilateral changes to investment agreements 
The shortcoming of Root's scheme is its failure to consider the marketing and operating environments. 
Overholt provides what is arguably the most comprehensive and useful target classification scheme by organizing 
32Franklin R. Root, "Analyzing Political Risks in International Business," in A. Kapoor and Phillip D. 
Grub (eds.), The Multinational Enterprise in Transition (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1973), p. 357. 
*compiled from numerous sources already cited. 
-
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things into the four groups discussed in chapter 1 to describe the business interests of a typical enterprise: assets, 
organization, operations. and markets. This approach, illustrated in exhibit 5.4, clearly links risk events with the 
types of effects they can have on organizations. 








Erosion of patent and 
copyright priveleges 
Seizure of data 
Business Risks 
Organization 
Over regulation/red tape 




-entering new markets 
Regtllatory indecision 
War, crime, riots 
Management 
indigenization 
Hiring and firing 
constraints 
Excessive, unfair, or 
inefficiently 
managed regulation 























Lack of growth 
Restricted exports 
Subsidized competition 




Regardless of how political risk is described, whether it is political or practical in origin, and how it can 
affect a direct investment, the overwhelming conclusion is that the ultimate source of political risk is a conflict of 
interest between the host country and the investor. These problems have led some to label conflict between MNEs 
and hosts as inherent and intractable. 33 But although the near term interests of MNEs and host countries in FDI 
may be different, the reasons both are interested in FDI are mutually dependent and they undeniably have many 
*Taken from William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 1982), p. 33 and 
modified with information from pp. 33-36. 
33Gabriel (1974[1972]), op. cit., p. 137. 
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shared interests. 34 Both want to see economic growth and increases in production and profits,• both have an 
interest in a skilled labor force and capable local managers (less expensive than home country personnel), and, as 
rational actors, both are interested in mutual understanding and cooperation wherever possible so as to maximize 
the opportunity for both parties to profit from the relationship at minimum cost to the other. 35 The juxtaposition of 
extreme conflict of interest with an unavoidable mutuality of concerns, is reflected in exhibit 5.5, the expectations 
of developing countries's policy makers regarding the taking and using of profits from FD Is. 
This apparent paradox may be explained by a new theory which suggests hosts and investors may not have 
conflicting interests after all. Stevens argues the real conflict is between "technoglobalism" - global markets, 
competition, and enterprises - and "technonationalism" -- the protection of assets like jobs, markets, technology, 
and resources for the sole use of each individual country. Within this framework, conventional wisdom would tie 
MNEs to technoglobalism and countries to technonationalism, but Stevens says technoglobalism is in the long-
" 
term interest of all actors and all actors in the short-term can benefit from some application of technonationalism. 
She concludes, therefore, that the tensions which produce political risk for investors come from actors being at 
conflicting points along the 'technonationalism - technoglobalism continuum' at a given time. 36 
34Subhash C. Jain and Vinod Bavishi, "Strategies for Doing Business with LDCs, 11 Management 
Jntemational Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1979), pp. 70-71. 
*What happens to the profits, however, is often a matter of some contention. Generally the host 
government favors taxes and/or reinvestment and the MNE favors repatriation, but in the case of joint ventures, 
local shareholders tend to prefer high dividends and it is the MNE which favors reinvestment. Mason op. cit., p. 
12. 
35P. Streeten, "New Approaches to Private Investment in Less Developed Countries, 11 in John H. Dunning 
(ed.), Jntemational Investment: Selected Readings (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972 [Article originally 
published in 1969]), pp. 446-447. 
36Candice Stevens, "Technoglobalism vs. Technonationalism: The Corporate Dilemma," Columbia 
Joumal of World Business, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (Fall, 1990), pp. 43-47. 
•• 
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EXHIBIT 5.5: HOST GOVERNMENT EXPECTATIONS FROM MNEs* 
Reasonable rate of profit as a percentage of investment: 
Percentage of profits which should be reinvested: 
Percentage of profits which should be paid in host country ta"Xes: 
Percentage of gross income (before tax profits) which should be spent 
on research and development in the host country: 
Maximum percentage of managerial positions which should be filled 
with home country nationals: 
Maximum percentage of technical positions which should be filled with 
home country nationals: 
Percentage of total net income which should be spent on voluntary 
public service activities in host country: 
Voluntary public service activities on which MNEs should spend .. money: 
*Taken from Jain and Puri, op. cit., p. 65. 
**Total responses are over 100% due to multiple responses. 
20%ormore 
Between 15% and 20% 
Between 10% and 15% 
Less than 10% 
75%ormore 
Between 60% and 75% 
Between 50% and 60% 
Between 40% and 50% 
Less than 40% 
60%ofmore 
Between 50% and 60% 
Between 40% and 50% 
Between 30% and 40% 
Less than 30% 
5%or more 
Between 4% and 5% 
Between 3% and 4% 
Between 2% and 3% 
Less than 2% 
75%or more 
Between 50% and 7 5% 
Between 25% and 50% 
Less than 25% 
75%ormore 
Between 50% and 75% 
Between 25% and 50% 
Less than 25% 
10%ormore 
Between 8% and 10% 
Between 6% and 8% 
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While Stevens may be right in theory, the evidence is overwhelming that throughout the FDI process, 
. actors do not perceive a commonality of interest sufficient to eliminate risk. Nevertheless, the major actors in the 
FDI relationship are rational and will work to minimize the costs of their conflicts within the political 
·· environment. Therefore, "the political [environment] can be seen as a market in which groups ofindividuals both 
inside and outside government compete" for power, wealth, and the support necessary to create and use both. 37 In 
the simplest sense, political risk is the result of this competition for resources; this pursuit of interests, and it will 
continue to be a problem as long as there are actors in the environment who perceive interests to be in conflict. 
37Phillips-Patrick, op. cit., p. 653. 
Partm 
Political Risk Analysis 
"At one extreme, a seasoned pro might simply pick up the phone to chat with former 
associates at, say, the Central Intelligence Agency. At the other, elaborate computer models 
massage the surveyed opinions of foreign observers around the globe. 1 
Kobrin divides the approaches or methodologies used in political risk analysis into two simple groups: 
"those aggregating subjective assessments and those relying on quantified indicators of economic, social, and 
political factors;" basically a 'soft/hard' differentiation.2 These two kinds of techniques can be used separately or in 
combination, for general analysis or in highly specific applications, solely to analyze the occurrence probability of 
· political risk events or to consider the entire political risk equation. 
Chapter 6 considers and critiques the 'soft' methods, while chapter 7 examines those grounded in 'hard' 
0 
data. Each chapter includes assessments of strengths and weaknesses, general utility, and effectiveness -- all from 
a practical standpoint. Chapter 8 looks at the challenges for successful political risk analysis and at attempts to 
improve and build upon the techniques reviewed in chapters 6 and 7. 
Since the subject at hand is the analysis of the probabilities of occurrences in unique, two-stage situations, 
success is something hard to define. Among the criteria are simplicity, ease of use, cost, flexibility, and specificity; 
perhaps most important is the amount and confidence level of information yielded. This is the key to whether or 
not political risk analysis alone can be sufficient to protect multinational enterprises from political risk in foreign 
direct investment, and therefore to whether or not the second hypothesis is supported. 
1Bob Donath, "Handicapping and Hedging the Foreign Investment," Industrial Marketing, Vol. 66, No. 2 
(February, 1981), p. 57. 
2Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and 
Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strateg;c Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New York: 




Qualitative Approaches to 
Political Risk Analysis 
"Conceptual models and analytical methodologies that are intuitive and implicit rather 
than explicit represent the most common approach [to political risk analysis] among US-based 
international firms." I 
There are two basic ways to consciously analyze the political risk factor in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in an informal or 'soft' manner. One can study the past patterns of action of the actors in the environment in which 
an investment is being contemplated or one can gather and evaluate the opinion of e:-..i>erts on the question. 2 Either 
; way, qualitative analysis "rel[ies] principally upon the wisdom, experience, and judgment oLthe analyst" and 
(therefore occurs at a low level on the ladder of cognition. 3 
The Personal Approach 
Political risk analysis is frequently "based implicitly ... on a series of hypotheses that 
resembles nothing more than an extrapolation of existing tendencies, in which the politico-
economic future is supposed to unfold as the natural prolongation of the pa~t and the present. "4 
One looks to history as a guide to what will occur because the study of history so clearly reveals that 
things routinely recur. This shibboleth of historians is in many ways almost an article of faith for traditional 
political analysts and others in the social studies. History can indicate the patterns of behavior of actors, the timing 
and frequency of action by groups both in and out of government, the signs which tend to precurse changes and 
other potential risk events, the administrative capability of potential host governments, and the general nature and 
1Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Assessment by International Firms: Models or Methodologies?" Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 3, Part 2 (1981), p. 259. 
2John D. Daniels and Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments and Operations, Fourth 
Edition (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1986), p. 552. 
3Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple, "An Overview of Political Instability Research 
Methodologies: Basic & Applied Recommendations for the Corporate Analyst," in Jerry Rogers (ed.), Global Risk 
Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), pp. 76-77. 
4Michael P. Sloan, "Strategic Planning by Multiple Futures Techniques," Management International 
Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1984), p. 4. 
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caliber of governmental decisions over time. 5 At the vety least. the history of a potential host country, if 
considered over time, will usually offer a general indication "of the broad climate for operations" in that country 
overtime.6 
The historical approach. writes Sloan, "presents the advantage of the law of least effort, but it is also not 
without its dangers. "7 Put simply: things can change. Historians will argue that over the long term, patterns of 
occurrences will tend to develop in most countries; in many, such patterns may be clear even in the relatively short 
term. But short term for history - 10 to 30 years perhaps - is a long time to a potential investor. Not only is it 
possible for tile past not to repeat itself, it is possible the changes expected will happen at unexpected times or in 
unexpected ways. "A simple-minded extrapolation from the past to the future" can lead to a business disaster if a 
government or a system of government changes (or fails to change) against the historical pattern. 8 These are, of 
course, strong arguments to e:\.1end any historical investigation into the present. To properly analyze an 
environment one must learn about the current political system, government. and opposition, what their 
vulnerabilities are, and who is dependent upon whom; one must evaluate "the country's ability to withstand adverse 
circumstances. 119 . 
In conducting a historically-based current assessment. it is easy to overlook something, or more likely 
several things, of potential importance. This can be overcome by creating a checklist of information necessary to 
conduct a proper analysis of the political risk equation. As shown in exhibit 6.1, a list can make the gathering and 
analysis of information a more systematic process and thereby improve the efficiency and efficacy of the analysis. 
5J.N. Robinson, "Is it Possible to Assess Country Risk?" The Banker, Vol. 131, No. 659 (January, 1981), 
p. 73. 
6John D. Daniels, Ernest W. Ogram, Jr., and Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments 
and Operations, Second Edition (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 335. 
7Sloan, op. cit., p. 4. 
8Thomas L. Brewer, "Political Risk Assessment for Foreign Direct Investment Decisions: Better Methods 
for Better Results," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XVI, No. l (Spring, 1981), p. 8. 
9Robinson, op. cit., p. 73. 
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EXHIBIT 6.1: CHECKLIST FOR POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS* 
Internal Aspects of the Country 
History 
Time and mode of independence? 
Record of Stability? 
Homogeneity 
Sense of national unity? 
History of conflicts between ethnic or religious groups? 
Is there a dominant ethnic group or are groups of equal 
strength? 
Form of Government 
Democracy 
Strong opposition parties with radically different 
ideology? 
Effective government or chaotic situation? 
Corruption? 
Voting along ethnic lines? 
Is government sensitive to needs of population? 
Military government 
Widespread popular support or national liberation 
front? 
How strong is the army? 
Rivalries among army commanders? 
Underground opposition strong? 
Did military government follow ineffective, unpopular 
democracy? 
Are civil servants utilized or alienated? 
Are there alternative power bases? 
Return to civil rule planned? 
· One-man, one-party state 
What if present leader dies? 
Are various· ethnic groups represented in government? 
Is' military major contender for power? 
Is civil setvice strong and independent? 
Is opposition effectively organized; does it have moral 
stature? 
Is there a specific interest group opposing regime? 
Sources of potential unrest 
Are the young, intellectuals, civil servants, military, 
biisinessmen, or public opinion alienated from 
government? · 
Is there a suppressed minority group? 
Are there conflicts between the central government and 
traditional regional centers of power? 
Is strong foreign government influence resented? 
Is unemployment high? 
Is corruption widespread? Who are the victims? 
Is there a sense that the government is unusually 
ineffective or that there is no economic progress? 
Is economic progress confined to the center or 
purposely spread over the country as a whole? 
Is the economic gap between elite and the populace 
widening or narrowing? 
Drastic political changes 
Will a change in government or a coup lead to a drastic 
change in political orientation or chaos? 
Is there any chance of a civil war? 
Would a coup lead to political paralysis and a 
counterswing? 
Would the next political regime be more/less likely to 
renounce of reschedule debt for political/ 
ideological reasons? 
External Aspects of the Countrv 
Danger of war 
Is the area as a whole explosive or calm? 
Are there major sources of conflict with neighbors? 
Will a war seriously impair the economy? 
Economic relations 
Is there a threat of an effective economic boycott? 
Are relations with major aid donors stable? 
Are relations with World Bank and IMF healthy? 
Are there plans for political agree-ments with major 
trade-blocs for ensured access to major markets? 
Does the country want to increase U.S. investment and 
trade? 
Does the U.S. government have any leverage? 
*Taken from Antoine W. van Agtmael, "How Business Has Dealt With Political Risk," Financial Executive, 
Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (January, 1976), pp. 27-28. 
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But the existence of a list also can create the prima facie appearance that everything of importance is on the list 
and thereby can lead to a major oversight should something have been left off. 10 
A second problem is more difficult to overcome. The information available about a potential host country, 
particularly a developing country, can be extremely limited. The easily accessible history often consists of little 
more than a few survey volumes, rife with the interpretations of their authors, while readily obtainable current 
information is often as narrow - failing to cover areas which could be very important to the investor but are 
otherwise obscure -- and/or the product of the government information office and therefore of dubious utility. One 
management textbook advocates dealing with this by 
"reading statements made by political leaders both in and out of office in order to determine their political 
philosophies on business in general [and their attitudes toward foreign investors and various home 
countries and analyzing] the context of statements to determine whether they exi>ress true intentions or 
were made merely to appease particular interest groups or social strata." 11 
Good advice, but much easier to do when one is considering investing in Belgium, for instance, than in Zaire. 
Another approach to overcoming this problem is to go to the source and take what has become known as a 
"Grand Tour" of the country under consideration. Such tours are ideal in a number of ways, providing 
opportunities to meet, look, and listen; to experience the investment environment and its reaction to investors. 12 A 
well organized tour can fill in a lot of the blanks left from earlier investigations through meetings with local 
business leaders, journalists, dissidents, academics, labor leaders, members of the intelligentsia, and political 
leaders of all stripes. 13 In systematizing the tour, it is possible however, to commit the same oversight errors as 
with other types of checklists. Additional difficulties endemic to the 'grand tour' are likely to cause even more 
serious problems. 
Grand tours tend to be just that -- grand. Top executives of MNEs are important people and, even if they 
do not want to be treated as such, the host government is likely 'roll out the red carpet' for them. Tour schedules 
IORobert Grosse and John Stack, "Non-Economic Risk Evaluation in Multinational Banks," Management 
International Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1984), p. 47. 
llDaniels, Ogram, and Radebaugh, op. cit., pp. 336-337. 
12Daniels and Radebaugh, op. cit., pp. 553-554. 
13Daniels, Ogram, and Radebaugh, op. cit., p. 337. 
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can become clogged with 'top level' briefings in which negative information may be glossed over or ignored 
altogether, guided tours which never include people or places the host fears would discourage the investor, and 
other special events designed to make the trip more a recruiting visit than an on-the-scene investigation into 
potential risk factors. Even in the best cases, when executives have the desire and sufficient foreknowledge to seek 
the infonnation they need, their high profiles limit their freedom to visit who and what they wish. More often, 
MNE executives are quite happy to be celebrities and such unimportant details as "difficulty in clearing customs, a 
bad meal, or other displeasing firsthand experiences can, unfortunately, have a profound effect on their evaluation 
of a particular country." 14 
Expert Generated Data 
When businesses believe specific expe,rtise, and or the ability to look at things more objectively, can help 
them resolve or avoid problems, they hire consultants. In the United States, and to a growing extent in Europe, 
there are entire business communities of management and marketing consultants, to name only the best known, 
filling this role. Political risk consultants are generally either political analysts with specific country expertise or 
analytical methodologies to offer, or old hands with a background in intelligence work (Richard Helms, for 
example, the former U.S. Director of Central Intelligence and Ambassador to Iran who has a small consulting firm 
called Safeer*) or diplomacy (the best known example of this sort of firm is Kissinger & Associates, run by the 
former US Secretary of State). MNEs which use informal analytical methods generally use old hands. lS 
In order to be useful, old hands must offer more than just experience and intelligence. They must be able 
to analyze what may happen in the future, not only relate what happened in the past, and must compile and 
communicate the information in such a way as to make it applicable to the proposed project. 16 Even consultants 
14R.J. Rummel and David A. Heenan, "How Multinationals Analyze Political Risk," in Douglas N. 
Dickson (ed.), Managing Effectively In the World Marketplace (New York: Harvard Business Review and John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1983), pp. 382-384. 
*'Ambassador' in Persian. 
15Louis Kraar, "The Multinationals Get Smarter About Political Risks," Fortune, Vol. 101, No. 6 (March 
24, 1980), p. 87. 
16Rurnrnel and Heenan, op. cit., pp. 384-385. 
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skilled at these tasks make mistakes and have an inherent bias which cannot but show in their work. The 
responsible executive must take these potential problems into account. 17 
The Delphi method is a systemization of the use of experts designed to minimize the impact of any single 
expert's bias or errors. 18 The system was developed in the late 1960s by the RAND Corporation, a non-profit 
California think tank which borrowed the name from the famous Greek oracle. Delphi surveys ask the same 
questions of a number of experts, give them a chance to review and consider the answers of others (and to discuss 
them among themselves if the survey is being conducted in person), and then compile final thoughts for use by the 
. ' 
investor.19 The panel of experts is usually composed of a wide variety of people with various professional 
backgrounds and opposing political viewpoints. Ideally, this approach results in a sufficiently broad array of advice 
to overcome the bias inherent in the ideas of each individual. 20 
,.., 
\If Delphi appears to solve many of the difficulties associated with the use of single consultants, it also 
'-" " D 
creates a number of new problems of its own. The 'ideal' Delphi scenario is to have the experts sitting around a 
table working with one another to reach consensus on those issues where it is possible and to clarify the alternative 
options in those areas where it is not. At best, this is an expensive process, difficult for small firms to use. 
Ironically though, if the investing MNE can afford the personal approach, it might end up getting a product not 
worth the extra expense. While face to face contact may seem an efficient way to 'smooth' discontinuities and 
produce a more useful final product, the role of personalities is enhanced in face to face situations and the risk of 
bias in the final product due to the excessive influence of dominant personalities therefore increase~ 
In order to avoid both of these difficulties, Delphi surveys are usually done on paper through the mail. 
This creates a potential control and motivation problem because the experts are essentially 'on their honor' to do 
17Martin Shubik, "Political Risk: Analysis, Process, and Purpose," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing 
International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 120-122. 
18Charles W. Hofer and terry P. Haller, "GLOBESCAN: A Way to Better International Risk 
Assessment," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational 
Corporations: The Essentials (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1980]), 
pp. 152-153. 
19Shubik, op. cit., pp. 127-129 and Andriole and Hopple, op. cit., p. 80. 
20William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 1982), pp. 8-9. 
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their best. In addition, by effectively duplicating the form of a checklist, Delphi surveys may suffer from their 
problems as well.21 Finally, the indirect approach creates an enormous amount of paperwork because surveys with 
open-ended answers can be so lengthy. To make the survey more user friendly at both ends, the majority of remote 
Delphi surveys utilize a scoring system where the expert answers questions by choosing a 'value' from a nominal 
scale. Although this eases the workload tremendously, it raises yet more potential problems. 
A nominal scale is really nothing more than a representation of a qualitative judgment, an arbitrary 
"coding device for identifying items[,] and has nothing to do with quantification." But the assignment of a number 
falsely implies a numerical value which can be mathematically manipulated. If '5' represents certainty that a given 
risk event will affect an investment and 'l' represents certainty that it will not, '2,' '3,' and '4' have no real value. It 
may be said they represent 'points along the continuum' or 'degrees' of difference, but the 'difference' is not a 
thermometer demarcated in finite, representable intervals and the 'continuum' has no measurable length, therefore 
2, 3, and 4 are just labels. 22 
The only conceptual problem of nominal scales, provided their limitations are recognized, stems from the 
fact the arbitrary 'labels' may well represent different concepts to each expert who participates in the survey. 
Practically however, this issue only exacerbates the more serious problem: the need to aggregate the survey 
responses for some form of final report or recommendation. In a face to face Delphi, this can be done by the 
experts themselves; in an extended answer mail survey, it can be done by staff (although not without the attendant 
risks of distortion). With numbers alone and no words to help those who would interpret them, aggregation can 
only be done mathematically, and this, for the reasons just outlined, will inevitably produce an effectively 
meaningless 'score.' 
Regardless of how the Delphi survey is run, there are two other basic difficulties which limit their 
potential for reliability and effective utility. There is no truly effective way to reach consensus between 
diametrically opposed viewpoints. 'Yes' and 'no' cannot be averaged. In any Delphi which includes widely 
divergent opinions, there will have to be a choice of an 'expert among experts,' a choice which seems inherently 
21Shubik, op. cit., pp. 127-129. 
22Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,'' The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4 (December, 1970), p. 1036. 
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opposed to the purpose of the original exercise. 23 In addition, the very nature of the method is theoretically 
inadequate. No matter how many different experts are involved in an attempt to neutralize the effect of individual 
biases, the sample can never be large or random enough to reach this goal. In effect, Delphi only serves to alter, 
and sometimes to hide, the bias in the recommendations, not to eliminate it. 24 It could even be argued that the 
nature of the Delphi approach undermines the real value of multiple experts - their distinctly different points of 
view and ideas. 
Conclusions 
Political risk analysis methods informed by traditional social studies methodologies have much to 
recommend them. They are highly flexible and can address the entire risk equation from a firm specific point of 
"view, but have a severe shortcoming. They rely ultimately on purely intuitive judgments which can only be made 
at the bottom of the ladder of cognition. This situation can lead to missed opportunities (in cases of excessive 
conservatism based on a lack of faith in political risk analysis) or disastrous investments (in cases of misplaced 
confidence in the conclusions of such analysis). Either way, the results can be expensive. 
The use of systems like checklists can help overcome some of the problems of traditional informal 
methods, particularly when the system is to be used only as a procedural guide, not an inflexible regimen. But a 
systematic process can suggest an implicit level of understanding of the political risk problem which it does not 
necessarily contain. Procedural systems do not inherently recognize the two-stage nature of the political risk 
equation. Unless a system is specifically designed to address the unique characteristics of a given instance of 
foreign direct investment, it will not be able to support useful analysis of the second stage of the equation. 
The academic world - both business schools and the social studies -- told MNEs interested in political 
risk analysis to gather knowledge; to learn -- about the past, about the present, about alternatives. But traditional 
academicians talk of knowledge alone, not of where to get it, how to get it, or what to do with it once they have it. 
23Sloan, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
240verholt, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
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A good system can help resolve the first two problems, but the last can only be dealt with through an 
understanding of the. structure of political risk -- how political events can affect organizations. 
Chapter7 
Quantitative Approaches to 
Political Risk Analysis 
"From the mid to late 1970s, the emphasis in political risk analysis shifted from 
conceptually-oriented studies to more quantitative ones .... [This was because] the link between 
political events and economic ones was becoming more apparent to corporate decision 
makers ... [and] quantitative studies of political behavior [were becoming] accepted as an integral 
part of the discipline." I 
The perils of subjectivity in political risk analysis were only one of the reasons many major multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) began to try to keep their political risk analysis process as 'objective' as possible. 2 The other 
was a growing frustration with the inability to integrate p0litical analysis with the statistically based analysis of 
other business (6) risk.3 This would permit MNEs to "quantify risk in tfirms of potential costs" in order to 
integrate such costs into foreign direct investment (FDI) plans by altering the capital budget, shortening the 
payback time, or figuring an appropriate compensatory premium on the return on investment (ROI).4 In the terms 
of this thesis, statistical quantification of political risk should move confidence in the analysis of such risk several 
rungs up the ladder of cognition. 
1 Jeffrey D. Simon, "Political Risk Assessment: Past Trends and Future Prospects," Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Fall, 1982), p. 65. 
2David Kern, "Forecasting Country Risk," Country Risk Analysis, A Euromoney Conference (London: 
Euromoney Seminar Transcripts, June 10-11, 1987), p. 16. 
3In addition to examples raised throughout the chapter, support for this statement and examples of 
specific approaches may be found in numerous sources including John Calverley, Country Risk Analysis (London: 
Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1985), pp. 134-153, Robert Grosse and John Stack, "Non-Economic Risk 
Evaluation in Multinational Banks," Management International Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1984), p. 46, Gilbert D. 
Harrell and Richard 0. Kiefer, "Multinational Strategic Market Portfolios," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and 
Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1981]), pp. 288-289, Kern (1987), op. cit., pp. 15-
16, Stefan H. Robock and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), pp. 372-374, and Simon (1982), op. cit., p. 66. 
4Joseph Micallef, "Political Risk Assessment," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XVI, No. 2 
(Summer, 1981), p. 50 and Alan C. Shapiro, "Managing Political Risk: A Policy Approach," Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (Fall, 1981), p. 64. 
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This chapter will look first at the quantification of previously discussed analytical methodologies, then at 
deterministic models with roots in behavioralism, and finally at sophisticated econometric approaches. This 
organization is a roughly chronological representation of the development and implementation of the methods. 
Since the methods build on one another, descriptions and critiques which apply to each section will only be 
considered in detail when first introduced. Likewise, several issues already discussed, particularly the matter of 
nominal scales examined in Chapter 6, apply here and will not be reviewed in detail.* 
Quantification of Pre-Existing Methods 
The checklist and the Delphi survey are two methods to systematize political risk analysis which can be 
quantified easily. Like the traditional versions of these techniques, the quantified versions can be used in specific 
instances to analyze the entire political risk equation or in general applications to evaluate the political " 
environment and the first stage of the equation. Quantified Delphi surveys are often used by commercial political 
risk rating services to evaluate political risk in multiple nations and create rating indices which compare and 
contrast "levels" of political risk between nations. 
Exhibit 7 .1 offers a good example of why quantified political risk analysis is appealing to MNEs. This 
quantified checklist system has been used by a company which compensates for political risk by requiring a higher 
ROI - a "premium on risk." Quantification permits the insertion of a numerical value representing the 'level' of 
political risk in the equation for the generation of an ROI which 'accurately' reflects the risk involved in the 
investment. The checklist covers a variety of factors, some more purely political than others, but the assignment of 
rating weight and value to the factors is purely judgmental. There is no clear reason why capital repatriation is 
considered somewhat more important than the availability of local capital or less important than inflation, nor is 
there any indication of how something like political stability is to be 'measured. '5 
*One caveat, however: all the problems with nominal scales become more acute when numbers 
representing merely a qualitative description or label are treated mathematically as if they have real numerical 
value. 
5Robert B. Stobaugh, Jr., "How to Analyze Foreign Investment Climates: Four Techniques for Dealing 
with Trick Questions of Economic and Political Stability," in International Business: A Harvard Business Review 
Reprint Series (Boston: Harvard College, 1970 [Article originally published in 1969]), pp. 91-92. 
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EXHIBIT 7.1: CORPORATE RATING SCALE FOR DETERMINING A COUNTRY'S 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE* 
ltemNumber of Points ItemNumber of Points 
Capital repatriation: 0-12 Political stability: 0-12 
No restrictions 12 Stable long term 12 
Restrictions based only on time 
Restrictions on capital 
Restrictions on capital and income 
Heavy restrictions 
8 Stable, but dependent on key person 10 
6 Internal factions, but government in control 8 
4 Strong external and/or internal pressures that affect 
2 policies 4 
No repatriation possible 0 Possibility of coup (external and internal) or other 
radical change 2 
Foreign ownership allowed: 
100% allowed and welcomed 
100% allowed, not welcomed 
Majority allowed 
50%maximum 
0-12 Instability, real possibility of coup or change 0 
12 
10 Willingness to grant tariff protection: 2-8 
8 Extensive protection granted 8 
6 Considerable protection granted, especially to new 
Minority only 4 major industries 6 
Less than 30% 2 Some protection granted, mainly to new industries 4 
No foreign ownership allowed 0 Little or no protection granted 2 
Discrimination and controls, foreign versus domestic 
businesses: 0-12 
Foreign treated same as local 12 
Minor restrictions on foreigners, 
no controls 10 
No restrictions on foreigners, 
some controls 8 
Restrictions and controls on foreigners 6 
Some restrictions and heavy controls on foreigners 4 
Severe restrictions and controls on foreigners 2 
Foreigners not allowed to invest 0 
Currency stability: 4-20 
Freely convertible 20 
Less than 10% open/black market differential 18 
10% to 40% open/black market differential 14 
40% to 100% open/black market differential 8 
Over 100% open/black market differential 4 
Availabilitv oflocal capital: 
Developed capital market; open stock exchange 





Limited capital market; some outside funds (IBRD, 
AID) available 
Capital scarce, short term 
Rigid controls over capital 
Active capital flight unchecked 
Annual inflation for last 5 vears: 





















Quantified Delphi surveys of the political environment have an additional practical problem. Since 
"scores do not take industry and firm specific factors into account..., the scores of factors, such as attitude towards 
*Taken from Robert B. Stobaugh, Jr., "How to Analyze Foreign Investment Climates: Four Techniques 
for Dealing with Trick Questions of Economic and Political Stability," in International Business: A Harvard 
Business Review Reprint Series (Boston: Harvard College, 1970 [Article originally published in 1969]), p. 92. 
Chapter 7 Quantitative Approaches to Political Risk Analysis 67 
private investment and quality of local management. that often vary by industry [are reduced) to a common 
denominator that may not have any intrinsic meaning. 116 
Quantified checklists and Delphi surveys also suffer from some severe theoretical problems. 
Quantification implies the use of numbers "in relation to their arithmetical properties. "7 But as has been 
established, the simple assignment of a number to a judgment - the implementation of a nominal scale -- carries 
with it no real value. In order to have value, a number (such as a risk 'rating' in a Delphi survey) must actually 
represent something which can be conceived as finite and constant. As Sartori says, "we cannot measure unless we 
know first what it is that we are measuring. "8 Since the act of assigning a numerical label does not proviae 
automatically a measurable value, the 'quantification' of opinion cannot be considered quantification in any 
technical sense of the word and cannot (except by fluke) result in figures of any meaningful worth as 
measurements. It follows also that the impression of measurement along an interval scale which is given by a 
ratings system is, in these cases, equally illusory. Therefore, this sort of quantification cannot be considered 
sufficient to create or approximate a condition of accurately calculable probabilities on the ladder of cognition. 
An additional problem faced by any ratings service is the nature of the ordinal rankings implicit or 
explicit in its risk index. To say that country xis less risky than country y, the two countries must be comparable.9 
While it is reasonable to assert that two sovereign nation states can be compared, it may not be reasonable to carry 
that assumption down a level of abstraction to the internal factors in each state\~ The question is one of functional 
equivalence: do indicators mean the same things in different environments? The Soviet Union had a list of rights 
guaranteed by its constitution which was among the most extensive in the world, but they were all but meaningless 
in practice. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, does not even have a written constitution, yet the rights 
6Stephen I. Kobrin, "Political Assessment by International Firms: Mod_els or Methodologies?" Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 3, Part 2 (1981), p. 261. · 
7Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4 (December, 1970), p. 1037. 
8Jbid., p. 1038. 
9Jbid., pp. 1035-1036. 
10/bid., pp. 1047-1048. 
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enjoyed by Britons are among the most complete in the world. To have assigned comparative risk ratings based on 
examinations of the constitutional guarantees in these two countries would have been extremely misleading. 
The value of some risk rating indices was examined, more by accident than design, in a recent study by 
Chase, Kuhle, and Walther. They looked at ROI rates for FDI in 46 countries between 1972 and 1984 and 
compared them to the political risk ratings found in two commercial risk rating indices. The goal was to find out if 
political risk is a major determinant in the FDI decision making process, but since the ratings were used as a 
surrogate for the actual incidence of risk events (measuring risk effects on such a scale would be effectively 
impossible because of their specificity, so some form of surrogate must be used), the effect was an evaluation of the 
ratings themselves. Underlying the study were two major assumptions: investors demand a premium on risk, and 
they actually get it (meaning their demands are met sufficiently so that the premium should be identifiable in an 
examination of ROI). The results for both indices were almost identically inconclusive -sometimes the 
relationship between risk ratings and return was strongly positive (supporting the hypothesis), sometimes strongly 
negative, and usually not very clear. The conclusions drawn were that either the ratings indices are not very 
helpful and/or that conventional accounting methods are not capable of measuring the real return on foreign direct 
investment as valued by the investor. 11 The second conclusion has fascinating possibilities but is well out of the 
scope of this thesis; the first one however, seems reasonable given the theoretical and practical problems of the 
indices. 
Statistical Approaches 
In order to generate theoretically sound statistical analyses of political risk, political risk analysts turned to 
explanatory quantitative methodologies based on causal links between statistical data and specific environmental 
changes (risk events). The approach permits the leverage of real, measurable, numerical data in the derivation of 
likely outcomes and the calculation of statistical probabilities. Use of this method should result in high confidence 
levels on the ladder of cognition. The approach is an application of behavioralist theories developed in the social 
studies in the early 1960s which argue that certain factors automatically lead to certain outcomes (if independent 
11 Carmen D. Chase, James L. Kuhle, and Carl H. Walther, "The Relevance of Political Risk in Foreign 
Direct Investment," Management International Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1988), pp. 34-37. 
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variable x has value n, then dependent variable y will have value a (and 'a' only, not 'b' or 'c')). 12 Examples of 
causal relationships include: 'poverty leads to revolution,' 'worsening poverty leads to revolution,' 'a wide gap 
between rich and poor leads to political tension,' 'development leads to instability or to repression (which 
eventually leads to instability),' and 'relative deprivation of wealth [or] frustration of expectations leads to 
instability. '13 
Because political risk is a complex, two stage concept in which events impact different organizations in .> 
'\ ... 
different ways, it is not practical to postulate direct causal links between event and effect for other than specific , ; 
) 
circumstances. For more general analysis, analysts and academics alike often adopt political instability as a 
surrogate for the first stage of the risk equation. 14 Political instability is not political risk, does not automatically 
create political risk, and certainly is not the only source of political risk, but it does produce events which are of the , 
J; 
type which history shows have effect on business in general and foreign direct investments in partkular. * It is r: 
therefore reasonable to assume a study of instability could produce information useful in political risk analysis. 
Instability in this conception occurs when existing governments or structures fail to meet the needs and 
demands of actors within a given system and the failure leads actors to demand and/or actually create changes in 
12Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple, "An Overview of Political Instability Research 
Methodologies: Basic & Applied Recommendations for the Corporate Analyst," in Jerry Rogers (ed.), Global Risk 
Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), pp. 85-87. 
13These generalizations are found in many places and are all grounded in extensive theoretical work. 
Their immediate sources for this application include Andriole and Hopple, op. cit., pp. 85-87, John D. Daniels and 
Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments and Operations, Fourth Edition (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 554-555, Roberto Friedman and Jonghoon Kirn, 
"Political Risk and International Marketing," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (Winter, 
1984), pp. 66-67, William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 1982), p. 8, and R.J. 
Rummel and David A. Heenan, "How Multinationals Analyze Political Risk," in Douglas N. Dickson (ed.), 
Managing Effectively Jn the World Marketplace (New York: Harvard Business Review and John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1983), pp. 387-388. 
14S. Prakash Sethi and K.A.N. Luther, "Political Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some 
Problems of Definition and Measurement," California Management Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), p. 
58. 
*It is now widely recognized that political instability is a related but fundamentally different matter than 
political risk in FDI. This has not always been agreed upon, particularly not in the early 1970s, as has been 
explained by Robock and Simmonds and Sethi and Luther. 
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the government and/or the system itself. 15 Serious instability can lead to "radical political change" which 
"connotes the ascendancy to power of a person or group holding a different political philosophy than the person or 
group that it replaced. "16 Changes of this sort can be gradual or revolutionary, with the latter often implying a 
violent change of structure as well as personnel, and often entailing a substantially different set of relationships 
between actors in the environment. I 7 
Problems with Detenninism 
"The government is very keen on amassing statistics. They will collect them, add them, 
raise them to the nth power, take the cube root, and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must 
never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, 
who just puts down what he pleases. 
-Sir Josiah Stamp, Inland Revenue Department, England · 
(1896-1919)18 
In political risk analysis, the quality and utility of raw data is paramount. Achieving a condition of 
subjective probability, or even quantifiable uncertainty, on the ladder of cognition requires data which is both 
accurate and representative of the complete political risk environment. 
Independent data collection is prohibitively expensive, but unless they collect their own, political risk 
analysts have to adapt data not collected with consideration for business applications. Even under ideal conditions, 
this can be a handicap. 19 For data to be considered 'ideal,' they must be accurate, appropriate for the intended use, 
up to date, and, when merely a percentage sample of the whole, truly representative. If the data are to be used in 
comparative studies, there needs to be consistency in definitions, formats, data gathering methods and the 
15Patrick Doyle, "Political Risk Assessment: The View from an Export Credit Agency," in Jerry Rogers 
(ed.), Global Risk Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), pp. 37-38. 
16Robert T. Green, "Political Structures as a Predictor of Radical Political Change," Columbia Journal of 
World Business, Vol. IX, No. 1 {Spring, 1974), p. 29. 
17James E. Austin and John C. Ickis, "Managing After the Revolutionaries Have Won," Han1ard Business 
Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (May-June, 1986), pp. 103-104. 
18William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting: Political Risk and 
Economic Opportunity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), p. viii. 
19Sethi and Luther, op. cit., pp. 63-64. 
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applicability of gathering methods across samples.20 For example, the U.S. Census is conducted through 
questionnaires. This method may not be as acCQrate as, and therefore not directly comparable to, a census 
conducted by hand count; on the other hand, it is also not comparable to a census conducted in precisely the same 
manner, with equivalent questionnaires, in a country with a 10% literacy rate. 
As the example suggests, poorer countries tend to provide additional data problems. Obstacles tend to be 
greater in developing countries which appear to have potential for the most serious political risk. Data gatherers 
are often inadequately paid and monitored, publication of data can lag well behind collection, and supporting 
resources and information are rarely sufficient. 2 l Often, desired data is either censored by the government or 
simply not extant; when it does exist, it is often heavily slanted in favor of the sitting government. 22 One result of 
these data problems could be "an over reliance on a few readily available quantitative indicators" of environmental 
conditions by an MNE tied to the idea of statistically objective political risk analysis. 23 Another result is the 
effective impossibility of defining the variables in deterministic relationships with sufficient rigor and specificity to 
make the relationships directly applicable in operational situations. In operation, what are considered discrete 
events not only appear to have multiple causes, they also appear to have multiple effects (meaning either 
simultaneous multiple effects and/or a multiplicity of discrete effects). This is why tests of deterministic theory 
have demonstrated its inapplicability to practical political risk analysis, if not necessarily a theoretical lack of 
validity.24 
20John D. Daniels, Ernest W. Ogram, Jr., and Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments 
and Operations, Second Edition (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 326-
329. 
21 J.N. Robinson, "Is it Possible to Assess Country Risk?" The Banker, Vol. 131, No. 659 (January, 1981), 
p. 77. 
22Briance Mascarenhas and Clifford Atherton, "Problems in Political Risk Assessment," Management 
International Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1983), p. 25. 
23Thomas L. Brewer, "Political Risk Assessment for Foreign Direct Investment Decisions: Better 
Methods for Better Results," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), p. 8. 
24While Sartori does not deal with this problem directly, the reasoning employed here was derived from 
his discussion of structure and function in Sartori, op. cit., pp. 1046-1052. 
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There are also practical problems with the use of causal link models in political risk analysis. Even if one 
of these models could be used successfully to determine the probability and broad nature of political instability, it 
could not address the 'post instability' environment, the aspect of the first stage crucial to any follow on second 
stage analysis of the effects of instability on an l\1NE or its affiliate. 25 History shows that changes vary in nature, 
intensity, and result. Change the leader of Iran in 1979 and everything changes with him; change the entire 
political system of the Philippines in 1971 and virtually nothing is altered in the operating environment. Because 
political changes are so fungible, instability alone, without any signal of what will follow, has little value as an 
indicator of political risk. 26 
Furthermore, a measure of political instability may not recognize the potential for political risk in a 
country with a popular, stable, long serving government but no system for succession. 27 Likewise, a measure of 
government stability would be less than useless as an indicator of political risk in France's Fourth Republic or 
modern day Italy. Besides, change is necessary for economic growth and societal progress. Complete stability can 
only mean stagnation - a situation which, apart from any question of political risk, generally is not conducive to 
profit. 28 The conclusion therefore, must be that stability per se is not an issue; the issue is whether an l\1NE can 
identify a profitable opportunity from which it can continue to profit regardless of the changes. 29 
This conclusion is supported by an even more practical reason simple causal link models have fallen out 
of favor: they do not work. The simple truths of determinism have been found false: there are many poor countries 
not in revolt and when revolutions do occur, they tend to begin as things are improving, not as they are 
worsening.30 Since World War II this has been the case in Hungary (twice), Cuba, Czechoslovakia (twice), 
25Bob Donath, "Handicapping and Hedging the Foreign Investment," Industrial Marketing, Vol. 66, No. 2 
(February, 1981), p. 57. 
26Calverley, op. cit., p. 115. 
21/bid. 
28Qverholt, op. cit., p. 25. 
29Louis Kraar, "The Multinationals Get Smarter About Political Risks," Fortune, Vol. 101, No. 6 (March 
24, 1980), p. 98 and Micallef, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
30 . Overholt, op. cit., p. 8. 
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Nicaragua, Cuba, China, and the former Soviet Union. At the same time, countries as diverse as Costa Rica (poor 
despite its name) and those of the oil rich Middle East stand as counter examples to the assumptions that a wide 
gap between rich and poor leads automatically to instability.31 Even the theories of frustration and deprivation 
have shown a lack of predictive success. 32 
Since the deterministic relationships which were believed to produce political instability do not reliably do 
so, statistical models which presume to predict the probability of political instability through those relationships 
can be of no real use in predicting potential political risk. This has been confirmed by a recent study of U.S. direct 
investment in Central and South America from 1950-1982. Over the years, a number of studies have shown a 
limited, or more frequently, "absence of a[,] negative association between political instability and FOi. "33 Fatehi-
Sedeh and Safizadeh believe the failure of the studies to find any significant link between political instability and 
some indicator of real or perceived political risk is more indicative of bad study methodologies than a lack of link. 
In their study they do find significant negative association in some countries and evidence of mitigating factors to 
explain its lack in others. 34 
Three factors differentiate this study from what has gone before: 
1. The use of major real risk events (exhibit 7.2) as independent variables instead of risk indices; 
2. Separate analyses of each home - host country investment flow relationship instead of an aggregate 
analysis of all the flow into one country, all the flow from one country, or all the flow into one region (to 
eliminate any possible distortions from aggregation); and 
JI Rummel and Heenan, op. cit., pp. 387-388. 
32Simon (1982), op. cit., p. 58. 
33K. Fatehi-Sedeh and M. Hossein Safizadeh, "Sociopolitical Events and Foreign Direct Investment: 
American Investment in South and Central American Countries, 1950-1982," Journal of Management, Vol. 14, 
No. 1 (1988), pp. 94-95 provides a comprehensive listing of these studies. A similar list can also be found in 
Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and Lawrence H. 
Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1979]), pp. 136-137. 
34Ibid., pp. 104-105. These factors include industry specific factors which require investment virtually 
regardless of risk, factors which appear to lower vulnerability to potential risk events, the availability of political 
risk insurance, and particularly attractive market conditions or highly advantageous entry concession agreements 
which appear to offer a sufficient premium on ROI to compensate for the fear of potential risk. 
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EXHIBIT 7.2: LIST OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY* 
Variable Description 
Protest demonstrations 







Unsuccessful regular executive transfers 
Regular executive transfers 
Unsuccessful irregular executive transfers 
Irregular executive transfers 
Elections 
Imposition of [internal] political sanctions 
Political executions 
Relaxation of sanctions 
Deaths from domestic violence 
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3. Measurement ofFDI flows one, two, and three years after events (time lags so MNEs have an opportunity 
to react to events) instead of contemporaneous measurement (which can only show a failure to perceive 
and/or avoid a risk). 35 
The study suggests MNEs are very sensitive to political instabilify (and/or political instability does have a 
significant tendency to produce real political risk) but, as they often react only afterthe fact, they are not good at 
predicting and avoiding it. This failure at the FDI decision making level suggests bad political risk analysis and 
reflects poorly on the various analytical methodologies available during the period.•• Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh 
are also specifically disparaging of the variety of risk indices which have been used as surrogates for real political 
instability in the numerous studies which have failed to find a link, often perhaps, because of the inaccuracy of the 
indices.36 
*Taken from Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh, op. cit., p. 98. 
35 Ibid., p. 104. 
**No 'failure rate' for political risk analysis in FDI can be calculated because it is not possible to measure 
. the success ofFDI decision making in avoiding political risk; it is also impossible to gauge the cost of opportunities 
missed due to overly conservative judgment. 
36Jbid., pp. 95-96. 
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Powerful Statistical Tools ... 
"With much the same precision that econometricians apply to the forecast of economic 
events, decision makers can gauge a nation's political future. 1137 
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Many economists involved in political risk analysis, particularly those working for international banks, 
see as a solution to the lack of accuracy in simple causal link models the adaptation of more sophisticated 
econometric models. Econometrics is a broad term for arithmetical manipulation of statistical economic data to 
increase the accuracy and utility of the final figures. In risk analysis, econometric techniques are used to estimate 
the probability of future events from statistical data representing past and current situations. According to Foley, 
normal statistical models are merely data representations of existing situations and can only be used in prediction 
through the assignment of 11a set of somewhat arbitrary weights to the various statistical factors used, rather than 
estimating weights from the use of econometrics. 1138 Econometrics also could be a useful tool for linking the two 
stages of political risk because it "estimates the likelihood of discrete events ... for given levels of [independent 
variables]. 1139 
The nature of econometric methods, however, requires the values of most variables in the equation be 
constant - an impossibility in many political environments. Dougherty and Specter argue this problem can be 
overcome through the use of an econometric technique known as intervention analysis which theoretically permits 
the estimation of each variable through the development of a statistical trend line from the recent past and then 
examines the interaction of all variables in the future. A test of this theory using the GNP growth rates and 
political history of Chile, Greece, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines from 1951-1977 led to these conclusions: 
• High growth tends to lead to internal strife and socialism; 
• Flat growth tends to lead to the decline of strong leaders; and 
37Rummel and Heenan, op. cit., p. 386. 
38Patrick Foley, "Country Risk Assessment," Country Risk Analysis, A Euromoney Conference (London: 
Euromoney Seminar Transcripts, June 10-11, 1987), pp. 5-6. 
39/bid., pp. 9-10. 
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• Declining growth tends to lead to 'elitist' power struggles, military takeovers, and/or the rise of strong 
civilian leaders. 40 
Although these relationships have been true in some cases, the last fifteen years have produced numerous counter 
examples, including in some of the countries studied . 
. . . And Why They Are Not Enough 
"Powerful statistical techniques [can be useful] for protecting ourselves against sampling 
and measurement errors [and] also for establishing significant relationships among variables. 
However, statistical processing enters the scene only when sufficient numbers have been pinned 
to sufficient items. "41 
Ultimately, no statistical analysis can be any better than the quality of its statistics. Econometric analysis 
cannot correct for, or even identify, data which is inaccurate or incomplete in a consistent fashion. For reliable 
political risk analysis, "there are simply not enough data [of sufficient quality and quantifiability] to permit formal 
specification of relationships between ~ wide band of possible contingencies ... and environmental characteristics. "42 
In a circular fashion, the overdependence on the limited types and amounts of data available which appear 
sufficient for analysis requires and appears to justify definitions of political risk narrow enough to support reliance 
on such data. 43 Such reasoning is employed to justify the use of behavioralist-type causal link models which form 
the basis of econometric analysis of political risk just as they do simpler forms of statistical analysis. 
This means most of the problems of deterministic quantitative analysis carry through to econometrics 
despite the additional sophistication. For example, there is no guarantee that "apparent regularities derived from 
past data using econometric models will continue in the future" or represent the situation they appear to describe. 
An econometric analysis of a country with a high debt-service to exports ratio would, for instance, all things being 
equal, indicate a continuance or perhaps worsening of this ratio; a situation generally viewed as having high risk 
potential. But "a high ratio may merely reflect other factors [which would likely not show up in an econometric 
40David M. Dougherty and Christine Specter, "Intervention Analysis: A Tool for Improved Risk Analysis 
in International Business," Management International Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1982), pp. 9-19. 
41 Sartori, op. cit., p. 1037. 
42Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Assessment by International Firms: Models or Methodologies?" Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 3, Part 2 (1981), p. 258. 
43Sethi and Luther, op. cit., p. 66. 
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model of just the ratio] perceived by lenders as lowering [sovereign] risk and justifying high debt service." If the 
bankers are correct. the high ratio does not represent a high risk potential and would not be likely to continue into 
the future nor to cause political risk events.44 
Conclusions 
"The real danger is that a sophisticated approach for political risk assessment would be 
used by corporate managements as a 'black bOx,' giving interpretations that are questionable and 
based on data that are very dubious to begin with. n45 
Business people, particularly bankers and staff analysts with backgrounds in fields like economics, 
accounting, and statistical management techniques, are used to working with numbers and quantifiable concepts. 
In much of their work, they expect and depend on the existence of one best approach or right answer and the ability 
to realize it through statistical calculation. Their prejudice toward this 'reality' inevitably carries over to any 
analysis of political risk. But political risk is a fundamentally different field. Concept definitions are complex and 
inexact, the values of variables constantly change and are difficult to measure accurately, the statistical data which 
does exist or appears easily gatherable is often of questionable accuracy and rarely sufficient for the analytical task 
at hand. 
This is not an abstract theoretical critique of analytical methods based on behavioralist theory, but a 
conclusion drawn regarding their application to the task of political risk analysis in foreign direct investment. 
Three things make deterministic methods unsuitable for this task: 
I. It is difficult to identify the basic underlying causal links in advance in unique, two stage situations. 
2. It is difficult to gather sufficient data of sufficient quality to facilitate effective analysis of the first stage of 
the political risk equation, especially if the goal of the analysis is a comparison between political 
environments. 
3. It is difficult to apply even the best abstract analysis of the first stage of the political risk equation to the 
second stage without the use of judgment or intuition. 
44Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz, "Country Risk: Economic Aspects," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), 
Managing International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 75. 
45Sethi and Luther, op. cit., p. 65. 
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If the subjective approach with its roots in traditional social studies methodologies has proven insufficient for the 
analysis of political risk in foreign direct investment, so has the-'objective' approach with its roots in economics 
and behavioralist political 'science.' 
Chapter 8 
Toward a Better Approach to 
Political Risk Analysis 
"In assessing political risk, we are not concerned with the likelihood of change per se, or 
even of discontinuous change, but rather with the criteria that the 'rules of the game' under which 
the firm made its calculations of risk and return will not change in such a way as to obviate the 
original calculations." l 
The challenge for an analytical methodology for political risk in foreign direct investment (FDI) is to 
address the entire political risk equation. Failure to consider the background and source of environmental events is 
just as problematic as failure to consider the way in which such events affect investments. Avoidance of these 
pitfalls requires an analytical approach which, at minimum, implicitly accounts for the two stage nature of the 
political risk equation (as illustrated in exhibit 3.2). 2 Since political risk is relative to the characteristics of the 
investing firm, both the home and host countries, the nature of the investment, and other factors specific to. the 
investment, any structure used for political risk analysis should reflect these relationships as well. 3 This suggests 
the use of an analytical structure which is firm specific in its approach to assessing risk. Such a structure can assist 
in overcoming the "assum[ption] that the sociopolitical environment of a host country is the key variable in 
determining the continuation of profitable operations of an investment. "4 The structure also should integrate the 
lJoseph Micallef, "Political Risk Assessment," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XVI, No. 2 
(Summer, 1981), pp. 47-48. 
2Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Assessment by International Firms: Models or Methodologies?" Journal of 
Policy Modeling, Vol. 3, Part 2 (1981), pp. 268-269. 
3David F. Gould, "Political Risk Assessment in the Corporate Planning Environment," in Jerry Rogers 
(ed.), Global Risk Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), pp. 16-17. 
4Warnock Davies, "Unsticking the State of the Art of Political Risk Management," in Heidi Vernon 
Wortzel and Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1981)), pp. 144-145. 
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firm and its impact as an active participant in the operating environment into the analysis. 5 Finally, the analytical 
structure used should be flexible enough to deal with all environmental actors in any specific environment. 
An analytical methodology for political risk analysis should endeavor to operate at high levels on the 
ladder of cognition to maximize the level of confidence in its results. Since political risk, by definition, is 
effectively limited to the realm of uncertainty, analytical techniques should be systematized in such a manner as to 
facilitate the broadest possible collection and most efficient possible organization of data for evaluation. A strong 
analytical system not only guides an investigation, saves time, and limits the chances of overlooking potentially 
important factors, it can also provide the framework for direct data comparison, facilitate cross checks of data for 
accuracy and objectivity, and enhance the analytical abilities of non-experts. 
A third 'requirement' for an effective analytical methodology is flexibility. Both because inflexible 
systems can result in major analytical oversights and because the output of any analysis of political risk must be of 
value in the FDI decision making process.6 This means a) the process must be affordable and b) the results must be 
in a form both appealing and useful to decision makers. 
"Third World [sic] leaders sometimes speak of 'appropriate levels of technology.' Political risk 
analysts in a corporation must provide, on a timely basis consistent with executive needs, 
appropriate levels of analysis."' 
An analysis not tailored to the needs of decision makers who ordered it is irrelevant and a waste of resources. 
Brewer identifies three basic kinds of problems with the wide variety of traditional techniques for political 
risk analysis discussed in the preceding two chapters: 
1. They focus too much on specific factors like expropriation rates, financial statistics, or political instability, 
assumed to determine a 'level' of political risk; 
2. They utilize methods of information collection and analysis which tend to be too impressionistic and 
intuitive or too mechanistic and formalized; and 
SMartin Shubik, "Political Risk: Analysis, Process, and Purpose," in Richard J. Herring (ed.), Managing 
International Risk: Essays Commissioned in Honor of the Centenary of the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 135. 
6John Calverley, Country Risk Analysis (London: Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1985), pp. 132-
133. 
7William P. Kelly, "Political Risk Assessment: Half the Equation," in Jerry Rogers (ed.), Global Risk 
Assessments: Book I (Riverside, California: Global Risk Assessments, Inc., 1983), p. 155. 
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They neither incorporate nor support appropriately structured models of political risk directly applicable 
to the FDI decision making process.8 
To level such criticism is not to say the techniques thus far reviewed are without merit or utility, nor that there is 
some magic alternative which will permit investors to. avoid all political risk. On the contrary, the problem at hand 
is much too complex for such a panacea to be effective. 
The Academic Contribution 
Sethi and Luther argue the structure provided by formal models of political risk analysis is invaluable 
despite the danger that it might ''be treated as a substitute for reality," because such models "demand a formal 
accounting of dimensions which othenvise might have been ignored with qualitative assessments." But such 
models are "no substitute" for the skills and knowledge required for traditional political analysis: "solid e:-..i>erience, 
deep familiarity with the economic, social, and political environment (as well as the political leadership) of the 
countries involved, a willingness to look at the long-term prospects of direct foreign investments, and an 
appreciation of the legitimate needs and aspirations of the host.country governments and people."9 
Some of the earliest work along these lines was done by Dolph Zink, a Harvard MBA holder writing a 
doctoral thesis (International Relations, University of Pennsylvania, 1971) after a 25 year career in the upper 
management echelon of a U.S. based MNE. Zink's "conceptual guide" (exhibit 8.1) is basically an input/output 
structure which specifies paths linking various societal actors to the MNE through their influence on the performance 
of government. While it depicts certain elements of the structure as boxes, it does not presume any 'black box' 
activity (that is to say none of the boxes represent deterministic equations which, given input x will produce output 
y); instead they represent loci of actors which tend to operate within some sort of specific structures. Though Zink 
does not do it, it would not conflict with the model to portray the innards of each box as a diagram similar to this 
one. The structure describes a 'dynamic' system in which the inputs are "pressures exerted by politically relevant 
interest groups," including foreign and regional groups "in some cases," and the outputs are government legislation 
&Thomas L. Brewer, "Political Risk Assessment for Foreign Direct Investment Decisions: Better Methods 
for Better Results," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XVI, No. l (Spring, 1981), p. 5. 
9S. Prakash Sethi and K.A.N. Luther, "Political Risk Analysis and Direct Foreign Investment: Some 
Problems ofDefinition and Measurement," California Management Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), p. 
65. 
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and regulation and/or the activities of the bureaucracy (depicted in parallel because in many countries 
"administration does not necessarily correlate with the language of decreed or legislated acts"). 10 
"The pressure potentials of each domestic group of the system are conceived as a function of its value 
system (conception of desirable or undesirable ends, means and styles of action) multiplied by its political 
power which is determined by such factors as group size, leadership and organization, share of societal 
benefits received and interest span ... .Interaction among and between the several interests groups will also 
affect the manner in which government policy is influenced." 11 
"The influence of the [MNE] on the system is shown as a feedback representing the foreign investor's role 
as a political performer within the host society. This impact might be exerted at the level of 
administration (the bureaucracy), government (legislative and executive), political institutions (political 
parties, etc.) or within the interest groups themselves. 111 2 
*Taken from Zink, op. cit., p. 153. 
IOJbid., pp. 46-47. 
11/bid. 
12/bid., pp. 47-48. 
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The Zink model has some obvious weaknesses -- its narrow definition of political risk, its lack of 
systematic data gathering and analytical procedures, its lack of clarity about the role of statistical data in what is 
clearly an essentially intuitive analytical methodology, its failure to define the nature of political actors in such a 
way as to facilitate direct comparative analysis; its opaque depiction of government. But the new ground broken by 
this tool is substantial. Not only does Zink suggest and provide an illustration of ways in which risk events are 
caused and affect investments, he also ties the MNE and its affiliate into the picture and provides a construction 
which expresses the ability of an investor to affect the investment environment.* 
Writing a decade later, Overholt fills many of the holes left by Zink. Although he does not directly 
subscribe to the sort of structural guide created by Zink, Overholt does provide a number of tools which make using 
such a model much easier. 
them:•• 
First. he defines the inputs in the Zink model in such a way as to permit direct comparisons between 
All political groups and polities, whether formal or not, are organizations with some form of executive 
leadership,, institutional structure, and mass. social base. This "systematizes the collection and 
organization of information[,] identifies the issues one wants to collect information about[, and] enables 
, one to make use of the partial insights of all academic theories." 13 
Second, Overholt provides a checklist (exhibit 8.2) of questions to ask and areas to investigate in order to 
effectively analyze the risk environment. 
Third, he offers a conceptual structure through which to analyze the interaction or 'competition' of actors 
in the political environment: 
politics is the struggle of opposing organizations (or coalitions of organizations) and their strategies, 
goals, and values.14 
*This raises the possibility.of the ability to manage political risk. The management issue will be taken up 
in section IV along with a brief consideration of other strategies available to MNEs faced with the effects of 
political risk on a foreign direct investment. · 
**If the reader is not familiar with the basic rules of comparison in comparative politics, a good review can 
be found in Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4 (December, 1970), pp. 1033-1036. 
13William H. Overholt, Political Risk (London: Euromoney Publications, 1982), pp. 9-11. 
14Jbid., p. 61. 
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EXHIBIT 8.2: STANDARD COUNTRY RISK PARAMETERS* 
Domestic political 
Consensus on values, and principles of organization: 
-Do they exist? 







Centralization vs. decentralization. 
Social base of support. 




Relationship to 9r with: 
--North-South conflict; 
--East-West conflict [sic]; 
--OECD countries; 
--Sino-Soviet conflict [sic]; 
--key neighbors; 




Distribution of income. 
Employment. 
Ownership; MNE -- government -- domestic private. 
Spatial distribution of economic activity. 










*Taken from Overholt, op. cit., p. 76. 
Labor: 
-size and quality; 
-political role. 
Sectoral structure of economy: 




Balance of payments. 
Structure of exports and imports. 
Trade partners and diversification. 
Trade restrictions. 
Debt/borrowing capacity. 
Relationship to World Bank and IMF. 
Monetary exchange rate. 









Basic social goals (growth, equity, democracy, order, 
national security and independence). 
Priorities among basic social goals. 
Population. 
Population distribution -- age cohorts and ethnic 
cohorts. 
Population distribution -- spatial. 
Key social groups: 
-labor, middle class, military, government 
technostructure, political leaderships, small-
medium businesses, agriculture; 
--issues: size, influence, goals, organization, 
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FinaJiy, he furnishes a procedural system for analysis: 
"l. Analyze regime organization: 
- executive leadership; 
- institutions; 
- social base. 
85 
"2. Characterize the political/economic/social context of the regime and the regime's strategy for 
dealing with its problems; or, if the contest is between factions within the regime, analyze them 
in a similar fashion. 
"3. Analyze opposition organizations and their strategies. 
"4. Develop scenarios for possible political/economic outcomes. 
"5. (Derive the business implications of the scenarios.)"15 
Overholt's process is what is known among military planners as a net assessment or military audit. Sun 
Tzu, the strategic genius of ancient China, used this technique roughly 2500 years ago; it has been in development 
ever since. Shubik argues it is idea] for political risk analysis because like military analyses, "political analysis is 
also explicitly strategic; policy, to be successful, cannot be merely reactive. Intentions and capabilities must be 
taken into account. Moves must be planned and countehnoves must be assessed and evaluated." In order to do this 
effectively, the effort must be integrated into the organization, its inves~ent process, and its ongoing operations, 
not imposed upon them.16 
Integration with the planning process can be achieved through another military technique: the simulation 
exercise. It involves decision makers or analysts in the playing of a 'game' which simulates an entire business 
activity -- the making of a foreign direct investment, for instance -- and permits experimental usage of alternative 
strategies in the face of a variety of environmental contingencies. 17 A simulation exercise can be used to assess the 
receptiveness of an environment to a given investment and to identify and test different management strategies to 
be used should contingencies arise in the future. 
The key to an effective simulation exercise is a good set of scenarios "clearly rooted in history" expressing 
the trends which have led to current relationships, involving all major actors and their interrelationships, and 
covering a variety of potential future occurrences. By nature, a good group of scenarios represents sufficient 
research and intellectual activity in its construction to identify potential future surprises, avoid a simple reliance on 
15Jbid., p. 63. 
16Shubik, op. cit., pp. 125-127. 
l1Jbid., pp. 129-132. 
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the labels, public pronouncements and reputations of actors, abstain from dogmatic or inflexible responses to 
situations, and compensate for the tendency toward wishful thinking. Ideally, it will not only cover basic strategic 
options but inspire analysts and decision makers to develop new and better ones. As with any group being used for 
a comparative study, a range of scenarios must have a standard set of parameters such that "within each scenario, 
what is happening to the various parameters must be consistent." 18 
Conclusions 
There are integrated, multi-technique systems for the analysis of political risk in foreign direct investment 
which do succeed somewhat in applying the strengths of many of the techniques reviewed in chapters 6 and 7 
while mitigating or compensating for their weaknesses. The work of Zink, Overholt, Shubik, and others ·suggests 
it is possible to examine the entire political risk equation in a structured and disciplined fashion through which it 
appears possible to minimize, if not eliminate, the subjectivity inherent in the analysis of anything which cannot be 
directly quantified. Nevertheless, no model has been offered which is free of subjective or intuitive judgment; no 
structure has been developed which can facilitate the truly objective analysis of a political environment, let alone 
the effects on a given organization of events predicted in such an analysis. The political environment and its 
interfaces with individual organizations operating within it are "too complex for total understanding .... No matter 
how powerful a predictive tool one has, any estimate of a societal outcome will have some minimum irreducible 
uncertainty. "19 
The most that can be achieved are informal estimates of likelihood, approximations of probabilities of 
events and their effects. This alone is not sufficient for MNEs to evaluate accurately their likelihood of economic 
success over the life of a foreign direct investment. Therefore, as asserted in the second hypothesis, 
"If political risk is properly understood as a series non-quantifiable elements, analysis of political risk 
cannot be depended upon alone to protect multinational enterprises from political risk in foreign direct 
investment. n 
18Jbid., pp. 72-77. 
19Jbid., p. 71. 
Part IV 
Application and Conclusions 
"Focussing on the wrong issues, rather than inaccurate intelligence, is the cause of most 
poor political risk management." 1 
Part I of the thesis provided a foundatipn and ~qramework ~or the ,go~sideration of political risk in foreign 
. . ",. . . ~ \ . . ~ . , " . 
direct investment. Part II showed political risk to be a two stage, non-quantifiable equation existing under a 
condition of non-quantifiable, subjective, or complete uncertainty on the ladder of cognition, which can result in 
loss and is the result of sudden, discontinuous change in the dynamic environment. Part III established that there 
are many ways to analyze political risk, that due to the complexity of the subject and the unavoidable role of 
judgment, even in. the most quantitative analytical methodologies, there is an irreducible uncertainty, and that 
therefore, political risk analysis cannot produce the accurate probabilities of risk needed to protect investors. Part 
IV brings the thesis full circle by applying these findings to the problems faced by multinational enterprises 
contemplating foreign direct investment. 
Chapter 9 addresses the first question of application by examining the ways in which MNEs make 
decisions about FDI and conduct political risk analysis. Chapter IO looks at the application of political risk 
analysis to the investment process itself by examining different options for the management of political risk which 
have heretofore been referred to collectively as non-financial self insurance. Chapter 11 provides closure by 
recapping significant conclusions, reviewing support for the hypotheses, and revisiting the goals introduced in ' 
chapter 2. Chapter 11 then draws some final conclusions and looks ahead by examining gaps in this work and 
opportunities for future research. 
1Wamock Davies, "Unsticking the State of the Art of Political Risk Management," in Heidi Vernon 
Wortzel and Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1981)), p. 146. 
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Chapter 9 
Political Risk Analysis and 
the Investment Decision 
"Businessmen often look at the world around them as they would like to see it, not as it 
really is. The higher the managerial position, the greater the resistance to reality. There must be 
a conscious, deliberate effort to achieve pragmatic objectivity, to shed preferences from the past 
and to minimize the importance of experience, which does not help under new circumstances and 
conditions." 1 
In one of the first studies made of how multinational enterprises (MNEs) deal with political risk, Aharoni 
found decisions regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) are generally made by high ranking executives after 
little investigation. These 'gut decisions' reflect an intuitive evaluation about risk the executive presumes is either 
above or below a threshold of "acceptable business risk." 
In terms of the ladder of cognition, Aharoni's findings suggest decisions dealing with political risk in FDI 
tend to be made under conditions of subjective uncertainty. The presumptions often are based on preconceptions 
about specific countries, continents, regions, types of economies, or other arbitrary categorizations, and stem from 
"ignorance, generalizations, [and} projection of U.S. culture and standards to other countries." Aharoni ties the 
perception of risk to five factors: 
I. Differences in habits, culture, and business conduct -greater differences, greater risk; 
2. Physical distance between the home and host countries --greater distance, greater risk; 
3. A history of inflation or currency devaluation is perceived to be risky even though such changes are often 
profitable for investors; 
4. Government interference in the economy -- practices differing from those of the home government cause 
concern; and 
5. Level of development -- among other things, most surveyed businessmen do not believe developing 
countries can be counted on to honor contracts. 
1Michael J. Kami, "Planning In Times of Unpredictability," Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 
XI, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), p. 27. 
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The prejudice Aharoni found is summed up in this typical survey response: "I shall think twice before I shall go to 
' Asia or Africa. They are too risky. 112 
Aharoni's conclusions that political risk is seen as an obstacle but is rarely a subject of investigation have 
been confirmed by several studies conducted since his. One study found "the perception of the political situation is 
the most important non-economic determinant of foreign direct investment decisions, 113 while another found "the 
most frequently cited political obstacle [to FDI] was political uncertainty or political instability. "4 Zink's survey 
revealed MNEs would sometimes "bypass opportunities altogether [when faced with] anticipated risks that are 
difficult to quantify. 115 Even a 1973 Wall Street Journal study verified entire regions are routinely rejected for 
investment by major MNEs on the basis of perceived, non-specific "riskiness. 116 But studies also show "few 
companies undertake a systematic evaluation of political risks." A review of preinvestment surveys done under the 
" aegis of the U.S. Agency for International Development by MNEs interested in investing in Latin America in the 
1960s shows "with very few exceptions, political and social consideration received only slight attention. "7 Most 
political risk analysis done by MNEs considering FDI is conducted informally by non-experts and is "superficial 
and subjective" in nature. 8 
2Yair Aharoni, The Foreign Investment Decision Process (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School 
ofBusiness Administration, Harvard University, 1966), pp. 92-96. 
3Hans SchOllhammer and Douglas Nigh, "The Effect of Political Events on Foreign Direct Investments by 
German Multinational Corporations," Management International Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1984), p. 21. 
4Stefan H. Robock and Kenneth Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises, 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), pp. 355 and 369. 
soolph Warren Zink, The Political Risks for Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countries: With a 
Case Study of Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 44. 
6John D. Daniels, Ernest W. Ogram, Jr., and Lee H. Radebaugh, International Business: Environments 
and Operations, Second Edition (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 370. 
7James R Piper, "How U.S. Firms Evaluate Foreign Investment Opportunities," MSU Business Topics, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), p. 16. 
8Stephen J. Kobrin, "Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration," in Heidi Vernon Wortzel and 
Lawrence H. Wortzel (eds.), Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations: The Essentials (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985 [Article originally published in 1979]), pp. 137-139. 
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A study of the FDI decision making process of 40 U.S. MNEs conducted by Stobaugh may help explain 
the paradox. Stobaugh divides the methods of decision making into four groups: 
1. Go/no go choices are the most common type of decision and usually are made on one or two often 
superficial criteria. These decisions sometimes result in bad investments but more often seem to result in 
missed opportunities. 
2. The premium on risk approach requires a higher return on investment (ROI) than would nonnally be 
sought to compensate for high perceived "levels" [sic] of risk in an investment. Procedures for measuring 
all the variables involved in determining the appropriate premium to be charged vary from MNE to MNE, 
but the general approach (used by 80% of Stobaugh's subjects) is conceptually similar to actuarial and 
accountancy methods of dealing with various kinds of known risk. 9 
3. A range of estimates technique requires 'educated guesses' of the value of the independent variables 
which can affect ROI. A range of 'guestimates' for each variable are run through a variety of scenarios for 
each of which an estimate of ROI is made. As with the premium on risk approach, the ways of executing 
this concept are many and varied. Since the range approach is borrowed from economic modelling, and 
since economic figures are easier to work with than imaginary political variables, exhibit 9.1 is an 
monetary example of a how a simple range of estimates works. 10 
EXHIBIT 9.1: RANGE OF ESTIMATES -- ONE YEAR FOREIGN INVESTMENT AT 
FIXED INTEREST RATE MADE AT 1:1 EXCHANGE RATE 
Exchange Rate Inflation Rate (%) Nominal Yield(%) Effective Real 
(ratio) Yield(%) 
Scenario 1 .9:1 2 10 20.00 
Scenario 2 1:1* 2 10 8.00 
Scenario 3 1.1:1 2 10 -1.82 
Scenario4 .9:1 5* 10 16.67 
Scenario 5 1:1* 5* 10 5.oo* 
Scenario 6 1.1:1 5• 10 -4.55 
Scenario 7 .9:1 10 10 11.11 
Scenario 8 I: l * 10 10 0.00 
Scenario 9 1.1:1 IO 10 -9.09 
*'Best' guess 
9Robert B. Stobaugh, Jr., "How to Analyze Foreign Investment Climates: Four Techniques for Dealing 
with Trick Questions of Economic and Political Stability," in International Business: A Harvard Business Review 
Reprint Series (Boston: Harvard College, 1970 [Article originally published in 1969]), pp. 91-93. 
10Jbid., pp. 93-96. The range of estimates illustrated in exhibit 9.1 is original. 
































